









None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Arnull, A 2017, 'The UK Supreme Court and the Preliminary Rulings Procedure', Yearbook of European Law,
vol. 36, pp. 314-357. https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yex00
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 08/11/2017
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Yearbook of European Law following peer review.
The version of record
"Anthony Arnull; The UK Supreme Court and References to the CJEU, Yearbook of European Law, , yex006"




Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020






The outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016 on the United Kingdom’s 
continued membership of the European Union administered a profound 
shock to the political establishment throughout Europe and beyond. In 
voting to leave the EU, the British electorate overturned what had been a 
major plank of British foreign policy for over 50 years, rejecting the advice of 
the then Prime Minister and most expert opinion. 
The reverberations of that pivotal moment in Europe’s post-war 
history will be felt for many years. The search for its causes will inevitably 
be wide-ranging. At the national level, the records of British institutions 
which have been most closely involved with the EU since UK accession on 1 
January 1973 are likely to come under scrutiny. Those institutions include 
the national courts, which have played a central role in the application of 
EU law in the UK. In undertaking that task, they have on occasion engaged 
directly with one of the EU’s most influential institutions, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereafter ‘CJEU’). The tone of their 
engagement has been set by the UK’s ultimate court of appeal, initially the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (hereafter ‘House of Lords’) and, 
since 1 October 2009, the Supreme Court of the UK created under the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
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The engagement of the national courts of Member States with the 
CJEU takes place mainly through the preliminary rulings procedure 
established by Article 267 TFEU.1 While most national courts enjoy a 
discretion in deciding whether to refer a case to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling, national apex courts (courts ‘against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law’)2 are in principle bound to do so by the 
third paragraph of Article 267. The purpose of this article is to examine the 
*Barber Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Birmingham, UK. I am 
grateful for the help provided with the writing of this article by Rachel Jarvis 
under the Undergraduate Research Scholarship Scheme organised by the 
College of Arts and Law at Birmingham. Many thanks also for their 
invaluable assistance to Graham Gee of the University of Sheffield; Michael 
Gration, barrister; and my Birmingham colleagues Fiona de Londras and 
Karen McAuliffe. 
 
1 See generally M Broberg and N Fenger, Preliminary References to the 
European Court of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed, 2014); D Anderson and M 
Demetriou, References to the European Court (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd 
ed, 2002); C Naômé, Le Renvoi Préjudiciel en Droit Européen (Brussels, 
Larcier, 2nd ed, 2010); K Lenaerts, I Maselis and K Gutman, EU Procedural 
Law (Oxford, OUP, 2014) chs 3, 6, 10 and 24. 
2 For discussion of the meaning of this phrase, see Broberg and Fenger, ibid 
223-230. 
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way in which the UK Supreme Court has negotiated that obligation in 
dealing with questions of EU law. 
Like what is now the EU itself, the reference practice of the UK’s apex 
court has changed beyond recognition since the House of Lords first sought 
the guidance of the CJEU in Henn and Darby in 1979.3 Although European 
integration has been politically contentious in the UK since the 1950s, in 
the early years of British membership the law applicable was technical and 
limited in scope. It had not been systematically studied by most judges and 
practitioners. The attitude of the House of Lords was generally 
accommodating,4 perhaps most dramatically so in Factortame,5 where the 
European Communities Act 1972 giving effect to the requirements of 
membership was held to be immune to implied repeal. Although there were 
the occasional flash points,6 the House of Lords did not align itself with the 
apex courts of other Member States by developing a constitutional theory 
3 Case 34/79 [1979] ECR 3795, EU:C:1979:295. 
4 See A Arnull, ‘The Law Lords and the European Union: swimming with the 
incoming tide’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 57. For discussion of lower 
courts, see Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, ch 7; Anderson and Demetriou, 
above n 1, ch 5; 55; A Dashwood and A Arnull, ‘English courts and Article 
177 of the EEC Treaty’ (1984) 4 Yearbook of European Law 255. 
5 R v Secretary of State, ex p Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85. 
6 Eg Duke v GEC Reliance [1988] AC 618; Freight Transport Association v 
London Boroughs Transport Committee [1991] 3 All ER 915.  
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that might allow it to curtail the intrusion of EU law in general and the 
CJEU in particular into national law. 
This article has five main sections. Section II offers a brief 
introduction to the preliminary rulings procedure, with a focus on the 
obligation to refer. Section III considers the approach of the Supreme Court 
to the interpretation of EU law. Section IV looks at cases where the Supreme 
Court made references to the CJEU, while section V consider cases where it 
declined to do so. Section VI examines the quality of the guidance supplied 
to the Supreme Court by the CJEU. There is then a short conclusion. 
The article will show that the Supreme Court makes enough references to 
avoid being accused of insufficient engagement with the reference 
procedure. However, it employs a range of devices to avoid making 
references where it considers that it would be inconvenient or unhelpful to 
involve the CJEU. The result is that the Supreme Court has effectively 
liberated itself from the obligation to refer imposed on it by Article 267 and 
now behaves as if it has the same margin of discretion in deciding whether 
or not to do so as lower courts.  Following the example of other apex courts, 
it has also become increasingly assertive in setting limits to the extent to 
which it will give effect to EU law in domestic proceedings. The limited 
deference now accorded to the CJEU by the Supreme Court is at least partly 
the result of preliminary rulings which have not seemed to the Court to be 
based on a sufficiently thorough analysis of the issues at stake. 
 
II. The Preliminary Rulings Procedure and the Obligation to Refer 
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A. Role and Function 
 
The preliminary rulings procedure establishes a formal framework for 
dialogue between the CJEU and the national courts of the Member States. 
Described by the CJEU as the ‘keystone’ of the EU’s judicial system,7  
its primary purpose is to ensure the uniform application of EU law 
throughout the Member States. The particular function of the obligation 
imposed on apex courts by the third paragraph of Article 267 is ‘to prevent a 
body of national case-law that is not in accordance with the rules of [EU] law 
from being established in a Member State…’8 
Although the third paragraph of Article 267 seems to express the 
obligation of apex courts to refer in absolute terms, its precise scope has 
long been the subject of debate.9 In CILFIT v Ministry of Health,10 the CJEU 
appeared to introduce certain qualifications to the obligation.11 In 
7 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 176. 
8 Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I-8151, EU:C:2005:552, 
para 29. 
9 See Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 230-273. 
10 Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415, EU:C:1982:335. 
11 The CILFIT qualifications apply only to questions of interpretation. They 
do not apply where the validity of an EU act is in issue, where the obligation 
to refer is unqualified: Case C-461/03 Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v 
Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2005] ECR I-10513, 
EU:C:2005:742. This seems to have been misunderstood by Lord Reed and 
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particular, it stated that there was no obligation to refer where the question 
concerned had already been dealt with in a previous decision of the CJEU 
(sometimes called acte éclairé). Even where this was not the case, the 
obligation to refer did not apply where the correct application of EU law was 
‘so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt’ (sometimes called 
acte clair).12 Before coming to that conclusion, the national court had to 
consider a number of factors. These included whether the answer to the 
question would be equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States 
and to the CJEU13 and the need to compare the different language versions 
when interpreting a provision of EU law. 
The CILFIT criteria were deliberately demanding and attracted 
criticism for being virtually impossible to meet.14 It is not clear how a 
national court might go about satisfying itself that an answer it considers 
obvious would be seen in the same light by courts in the other Member 
Lord Toulson in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015 UKSC 41, para 
28. 
12 Para 21. 
13 A supreme national court is not required ‘to ensure that, in addition, the 
matter is equally obvious to bodies of a non-judicial nature such as 
administrative authorities’: Case C–495/03 Intermodal Transports v 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2005] ECR I-8151, EU:C:2005:552, para 39. 
14 See The Role and Future of the European Court of Justice (A Report of the 
EC Advisory Board of the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law chaired by Lord Slynn, 1996) 75–7. 
Page 6 of 90 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
States. The injunction to compare the different language versions of a 
provision is particularly onerous, especially today when the EU has many 
more official languages than it did when CILFIT was decided.15 Advocate 
General Jacobs said in Wiener  v Hauptzollamt Emmerich16 that the CILFIT 
injunction on comparing different language versions should be regarded 
simply ‘as an essential caution against taking too literal an approach’ and as 
‘reinforcing the point’ that provisions of EU law ‘must be interpreted in the 
light of their context and of their purposes…rather than on the basis of the 
text alone.’ 
In 2000, a report by a European Commission working party chaired 
by Ole Due, a former President of the CJEU,17 suggested that the text of 
Article 267 should be amended to relax further the obligation to refer. The 
Member States chose not to follow that suggestion. Be that as it may, 
Broberg and Fenger observe18 that ‘there is a certain variance between the 
strict acte clair conditions established in CILFIT and the more relaxed 
interpretation that appears to be widely applied among national courts of 
15 See Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 249-252. 
16 Case C–338/95 Wiener v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I–6495, 
EU:C:1997:352, I-6517. 
17 See A Dashwood and A Johnston (eds), The Future of the Judicial System 
of the European Union (Oxford, Hart, 2001) 203. 
18 Above n 1, 254-255. 
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last instance.’ This was undoubtedly true of the House of Lords19 and is also 
true of the UK Supreme Court. 
 
B. The Development of the CJEU’s Case Law 
 
Two cases decided on 9 September 2015 by the second chamber of the 
CJEU led to speculation that it had given its blessing to a less stringent 
approach to the obligation to refer.20 In X v Inspecteur van 
Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v Staatssecretaris van Financiën,21 the 
CJEU was asked whether an apex national court was obliged to refer when a 
lower national court had already made a reference in a similar case raising 
exactly the same legal issue or whether it was obliged to wait until the lower 
court had received an answer from the CJEU. In João Filipe Ferreira da Silva 
19 See A Arnull, ‘The use and abuse of Article 177 EEC’ (1989) 52 Modern Law 
Review 622. 
20 A Kornezov, ‘The new format of the acte clair doctrine and its 
consequences’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1317; F-V Guiot, ‘La 
responsabilité des juridictions suprêmes dans le renvoi préjudiciel: with 
great(er) power, (at last) comes great responsibility?’ (2016) 52 Cahiers de 
Droit Européen 575. 
21 Joined Cases C-72/14 and C-197/14 EU:C:2015:564. Cf Case C-3/16 
Aquino v Belgische Staat EU:C:2017:209. 
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e Brito and Others v Estado português,22 the CJEU was asked whether an 
apex national court was obliged to make a reference where a directive it 
needed to apply had been the subject of divergent interpretations by lower 
courts in the Member State concerned. 
In X and van Dijk, the CJEU ruled that an apex national court was not 
required to refer ‘on the sole ground’ that a lower national court had made a 
reference in a similar case involving the same issue, nor to wait until the 
latter court had received an answer from the CJEU. In Ferreira da Silva e 
Brito, the CJEU ruled that, where a concept of EU law had been the subject 
of conflicting decisions by lower courts in the state concerned and frequently 
gave rise to difficulties of interpretation across the Member States, an apex 
national court called upon to apply the concept was obliged to make a 
reference to the CJEU. 
At first sight, these cases may appear to represent nothing more than 
routine applications of the CILFIT line of authority in straightforward 
circumstances. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that any reference was made 
in van Dijk (the second of two joined cases in which the CJEU delivered a 
single judgment), for the referring court could simply have deferred giving 
judgment until the CJEU had ruled on the first case (X). Advocate General 
Wahl tactfully observed that ‘even though it would be a rare event for a 
sensible application of the acte clair doctrine to be viewed differently from 
22 Case C-160/14 C:2015:565. Cf Case 379/15 Association France Nature 
Environnement v Premier ministre EU:C:2016:603. 
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Luxembourg, that risk cannot be ruled out entirely’23 and that ‘it might, on 
occasion be wiser to await the Court’s judgment.’24 
However, there were some subtle variations in the way in which the 
duty to refer was expressed. In Ferreira da Silva e Brito, Kornezov (a Judge 
at the General Court of the EU) pointed out that the CJEU’s ‘summary and 
rather general reminder of its CILFIT case law’25 did not reiterate the criteria 
referred to in that case. In X and van Dijk, although the CJEU referred to 
those criteria,26 he noted that ‘it did so fleetingly and not specifically…it did 
not recall their content, nor did it dwell on them.’27 Kornezov claimed that 
this was a ‘clear sign’ that the CILFIT criteria were ‘no longer considered 
mandatory, if they ever were’ and that supreme national courts ‘can now 
rely on the acte clair exception without having to show that each one of the 
rigorous CILFIT conditions are satisfied.’28 
Guiot argued that it was on the question whether the answer would be 
equally obvious to the courts of other Member States and the CJEU that the 
cases were particularly significant. He highlighted paragraph 59 of the 
judgment in X and Van Dijk, where the CJEU declared: ‘it is for the national 
courts alone against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
23 EU:C:2015:319, para 72. 
24 Para 73 of his Opinion. 
25 Above n 20, 1323. 
26 See paras 60 and 61 of the judgment. 
27 Above n 20, 1323. 
28 Above n 20, 1324. 
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national law, to take upon themselves independently the responsibility for 
determining whether the case before them involves an “acte clair”.’ This, he 
argued, constituted formal endorsement of a margin of appreciation in 
practice already applied by several apex national courts. Subjectivising the 
criterion relating to the absence of reasonable doubt in this way, he said, 
involved a change of policy by the CJEU on how the CILFIT criteria were to 
be policed.29 The CJEU had effectively acknowledged that the way in which 
the acte clair doctrine was originally framed in practice rendered it 
unworkable.30 In conceding in X and Van Dijk that a divergence of opinion 
among the courts of the same Member State as to the answer to a question 
of EU law did not rule out the application of the acte clair doctrine, the 
CJEU seemed to have abandoned the condition requiring the absence of 
doubt to be shared by courts in other Member States. 
Kornezov and Guiot placed much weight on the Opinion of Advocate 
General Wahl in X and Van Dijk. He took a liberal approach to the acte clair 
doctrine, observing that it would be ‘unwise for the Court to police the 
narrowest of interpretations of the scope of the conditions attaching to that 
doctrine.’31 He described the CILFIT criteria as ‘a “tool kit” for determining 
whether or not there might be any reasonable doubt. They are to be seen as 
warning signs rather than strict criteria and, read fairly, amount to no more 
29 Above n 20, 586. 
30 H Rasmussen claimed that this was a deliberate ploy by the CJEU: see 
‘The European Court’s acte clair strategy in CILFIT’ (1984) 9 ELRev 242. 
31 Para 64 of his Opinion. 
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than common sense.’32 The approach of Advocate General Bot in Ferreira da 
Silva e Brito33 was markedly stricter. He pointed out that, where an apex 
national court needed to resolve a disputed question of EU law, complying 
with its obligation to make a reference ‘constitutes the rule, while a decision 
not to make a reference is the exception.’34 He emphasised that apex 
national courts ‘must exercise particular caution before ruling out the 
existence of any reasonable doubt’ and said they had to set out the reasons 
why they were certain that EU law was ‘being applied correctly.’35 This 
meant that they had to ‘make a precise check of whether their application of 
EU law takes due account of the specific characteristics of EU law, the 
particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of 
divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union.’36 He added 
that it was ‘important that the Court adopt a strict position when it comes to 
reiterating the obligation to make a reference that is incumbent on national 
courts and tribunals against whose decision there is no judicial remedy 
under national law.’37  
32 Para 67 of his Opinion, citing D Edward, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost in their 
historical and procedural context’ in M Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past 
and Future of EU Law (Oxford, Hart, 2010) 173, 179. 
33 EU:C:2015:390. 
34 Para 89 of his Opinion. 
35 Para 94 of his Opinion. 
36 Para 95 of his Opinion. 
37 Para 101 of his Opinion. 
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The second chamber of the CJEU followed both Opinions without 
commenting directly on these competing visions of the scope of the 
obligation to refer. A degree of caution is therefore necessary in considering 
whether the two cases have broader significance beyond the confines of their 
own particular circumstances. In any event, one would not expect a major 
reappraisal of an important and widely known judgment like CILFIT to be 
effected by a five-Judge chamber of the CJEU. Moreover, if such a 
reappraisal, with significant implications for the role of apex courts in all 
Member States, were to be made, it would be important for it to be 
communicated clearly to the CJEU’s national interlocutors in a judgment 
that addressed fully its implications for previous case law. Indeed, if in X 
and Van Dijk the CJEU intended to relieve supreme national courts of the 
need to consider the likely attitude of courts in other Member States, it 
reimposed a new version of that requirement in Ferreira da Silva e Brito by 
emphasising the obligation of a supreme court to refer where an EU 
provision frequently gave rise ‘to difficulties of interpretation in the various 
Member States…’38 Once again, the CJEU did not explain how a national 
court might establish whether this was so. 
Perhaps the most that may be said for the time being is that these 
cases may prompt the CJEU, sitting as a Grand Chamber, to review the 
CILFIT line of authority when a suitable opportunity arises. If the Opinions 
of Advocates General Wahl and Bot are anything to go by, it would be 
38 Para 44 of the judgment. 
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unwise to place bets on the outcome. In Lyckeskog,39 Advocate General 
Tizzano cautioned against 
 
abandoning a line of interpretation based on assessment criteria that 
are as objective as possible for a line that leaves room for subjective, 
not to say arbitrary, assessments by the national courts…any other 
course would lead to a gradual erosion of the unity and uniformity of 
[EU] law and ultimately undermine its primacy. 
 
In practice, there will often be room for argument over whether the CILFIT 
criteria are met. This may make it difficult to establish when the obligation 
to refer has been breached. If that hurdle can be overcome, a breach may in 
principle lead to a claim for damages or infringement proceedings against 
the state to which the defaulting court belongs.40 Moreover, the European 
Court of Human Rights has held41 that Article 6(1) ECHR (right to a fair 
trial) means that  
39 Case C-99/00 Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-4839, EU:C:2002:108, para 65 of 
his Opinion. 
40 Opinion 1/09 on the creation of a unified patent litigation system [2011] 
ECR I-1137, EU:C:2011:123, paras 86 and 87. 
41 Dhahbi v Italy, no. 17120/09, judgment of 8 April 2014, para 31. See also 
Vergauwen and Others v Belgium, no. 4832/04, 10 April 2012, paras 89-90; 
Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium, nos. 3989/07 and 38353/07, 
judgment of 20 September 2011, paras 54-63. See Guiot, above n 20, 621-
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 national courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, and which refuse to request a preliminary ruling 
from the CJEU on a question raised before them concerning the 
interpretation of European Union law, are required to give reasons for 
such refusal in the light of the exceptions provided for by the case-law 
of the CJEU. 
 
In reality, however, the obligation is very difficult to enforce and relies in 
large part on the good will of national judges.42 
 
III. Interpreting EU Law 
 
The Supreme Court is frequently asked to decide on the correct 
interpretation of provisions of EU law. This section considers how it 
approaches that task. To what extent does it compare different language 
versions of EU provisions? How does it apply the principle of consistent 
630; J Krommendijk, ‘ “Open Sesame!” Improving Access to the ECJ by 
Requiring National Courts to Reason their Refusals to Refer’ (2017) 42 
European Law Review 46. 
42 See Krommendijk, ibid, 57-58; Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman, above n 1, 
102-104; AG Tizzano in Lyckeskog, above n 39, EU:C:2002:108, para 65; Z 
Varga, ‘National Remedies in the Case of Violation of EU Law by Member 
State Courts’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 51, 56-59. 
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interpretation, requiring national courts wherever possible to interpret 
domestic provisions consistently with overlapping EU provisions? 
 
A. Comparing Language Versions 
 
A notable feature of the approach taken by the Supreme Court in seeking to 
establish the meaning and effect of provisions of EU law is its willingness to 
compare different language versions. Although some Justices are known to 
be conversant in languages other than English, this places a potentially 
heavy burden on the parties and their lawyers. 
A striking example is R (Edwards) v Environment Agency,43 a case 
which reached the House of Lords before its jurisdiction was transferred to 
the Supreme Court. The President of the Supreme Court appointed two 
costs officers to carry out a detailed assessment of the appellant’s liability in 
costs. Among the issues they were asked to decide was the proper 
application of provisions contained in two directives based on the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. Reflecting Article 9 
of that Convention, each directive required members of the public to have 
access to a review procedure that was ‘not prohibitively expensive.’ 
An appeal against the decision of the costs officers was referred to a 
panel of five Justices. On the meaning of the word ‘prohibitively’ in the 
Aarhus Convention and the question whether a costs order made at the 
43 [2010] UKSC 57. 
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outset of the proceedings precluded further consideration of the matter once 
they had come to an end, Lord Hope (with whom the other Justices agreed) 
observed:44 
 
The Aarhus Convention has been authenticated in three languages: 
English, French and Russian. The English word “prohibitively” in the 
English version of article 9 suggests that the question is for 
consideration at the outset, as the act of prohibiting must always 
anticipate what is prohibited. The French language version uses the 
word prohibitif. The Russian text uses the word недоступно, 
indicating that the costs must not be inaccessibly high. The words 
“prohibitively” and “prohibitif” are carried forward into the English 
and French language versions of the EU directives and the adjective 
απαγορευτικό in the Greek version carries the same meaning. But 
the words used in the translations of the directives into German 
(übermässig teuer), Italian (eccessivamente onerosa) and Spanish 
(excesivamente onerosos) indicate that, so far as the directives are 
concerned, the question of expense is not exclusively for consideration 
at the outset. 
 
The Court concluded that the correct test was unclear. Citing CILFIT, it 
therefore referred the question to the CJEU.45 
44 Para 24 of the judgment. 
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 For present purposes, the Edwards case is notable for the 
exceptionally wide range of language versions of the crucial term considered 
by the Supreme Court. Versions of important provisions in languages other 
than English have, however, been considered in many cases, including 
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority (French and German);46 
Goluchowski v District Court in Elblag, Poland (French, German and 
Spanish);47 X v Mid Sussex CAB (French, Spanish, Dutch and German);48 
and R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport 
(French, Spanish, German, Dutch, Italian, with an extensive quotation in 
German from a judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht).49 The 
practice of the Supreme Court therefore shows complete acceptance of the 
need to compare different language versions when interpreting provisions of 
45 For the ruling of the CJEU, see Case C-260/11 Edwards and 
Pallikaropoulos v Environment Agency and Others EU:C:2013:221; G De 
Baere and J Nowak, ‘The right to “not prohibitively expensive” judicial 
proceedings under the Aarhus Convention and the ECJ as an international 
(environmental) law court: Edwards and Pallikaropoulos’ (2016) 53 Common 
Market Law Review 1727. For the application of the CJEU’s ruling by the 
Supreme Court, see R (Edwards and another) v Environment Agency and 
others (No 2) [2013] UKSC 78. 
46 [2012] UKSC 22. This case is considered in more detail below. 
47 [2016] UKSC 36. 
48 [2012] UKSC 59. 
49 [2014] UKSC 3. This case is considered in more detail below. 
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EU law and an impressive capacity to do so. It should be regarded as 
complying fully with the CILFIT injunction on the matter, sensibly 
construed. 
 
B. The Principle of Consistent Interpretation 
 
A significant constraint on the Supreme Court’s right to interpret domestic 
provisions occupying the same field as provisions of EU law is imposed by 
the principle of consistent interpretation. A helpful elaboration of that 
principle may be found in Angelidaki,50 where the CJEU declared:51 
 
…when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to 
interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result 
sought by the directive… This obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity with [EU] law concerns all provisions of national law, 
whether adopted before or after the directive in question… 
 
50 Joined Cases C-378/07 to C-380/07 [2009] ECR I-3071, EU:C:2009:250. 
51 Para 197. 
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Although most of the CJEU’s case law concerning the principle is concerned 
with directives, it applies in the same way to all provisions of EU law. It is 
not confined to domestic provisions adopted to implement directives.52 
After a shaky start,53 the principle of consistent interpretation came to 
be applied by the House of Lords in a highly conscientious manner, which 
might involve reading additional words into national measures adopted to 
give effect to the requirements of EU law.54 The principle is routinely applied 
by the Supreme Court when the correct meaning of national provisions 
designed to implement EU law is in issue. The CJEU has accepted that it 
will not always be possible to achieve a result which satisfies the 
requirements of EU law through consistent interpretation of national law.55 
However, where it is possible for an apex national court to establish the 
meaning of the applicable EU provision to its own satisfaction and then to 
interpret the overlapping provision of national law accordingly, it will be 
unlikely to consider itself bound to make a reference to the CJEU. 
52 See eg Case 157/86 Murphy v An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR I-673; 
Joined Cases C-397/01 and C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz 
[2004] ECR I-8835, EU:C:2004:584. 
53 See Duke v GEC Reliance [1988] AC 618; Finnegan v Clowney Youth 
Training Programme [1990] 2 AC 407. 
54 Pickstone v Freemans [1989] AC 66; Litster v Forth Dry Dock [1990] 1 AC 
546; Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1993] 1 WLR 49; Arnull, above n 4, 69-73. 
55 Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, EU:C:1994:292; 
para 27 
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A nice example of the principle of consistent interpretation in action is 
Robertson v Swift,56 which involved Directive 85/777 to protect the 
consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises57 
(sometimes called the door-step selling directive). The directive gave 
consumers a right of cancellation and required traders to give them written 
notice of that right. Neither the directive nor the UK implementing 
regulations specified the consequences where a trader failed to do so, as 
occurred in Robertson v Swift.  The CJEU had held that Member States were 
required to ensure that the trader rather than the consumer bore the 
consequences in these circumstances.58 Could the national regulations be 
interpreted in a way that enabled that result to be achieved? Lord Kerr, 
giving the judgment of the Court, concluded without undue difficulty that 
they could.59 
Lord Kerr drew attention to the judgment of Sir Andrew Morritt, C in 
Vodafone 2 v HMRC.60 There, Lord Kerr said, the ‘breadth and importance’ of 
the principle of consistent interpretation had been ‘authoritatively set out’. 
The desire to paraphrase for a domestic audience the sometimes stilted 
56 [2014] UKSC 50. 
57 OJ 1985 L 372/31. See now Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights, OJ 
2011 L 304/64. 
58 Case C-350/03 Schulte [2005] ECR I-9215, EU:C:2005:637. 
59 See paras 31-33 of his judgment. 
60 [2010] Ch 77, paras 37 and 38. See also USA v Nolan [2015] UKSC 63, 
para 14 (Lord Mance). 
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language of the CJEU may be readily understood. None the less, the 
enterprise risks obscuring or distorting the CJEU’s case law. The summary 
given by the Chancellor was not his own, but had been produced by counsel 
for one of the parties, though without dissent from counsel for the other 
party. It purported to give an exhaustive list of the ‘constraints on the broad 
and far-reaching nature of the interpretative obligation’. Unfortunately the 
list failed to mention that, as the CJEU pointed out in Angelidaki,61 the 
obligation is ‘limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity’ and that it ‘cannot serve as the basis for an 
interpretation of national law contra legem.’ Moreover, it takes effect only 
once the period allowed for transposing the directive into national law has 
expired.62 Perhaps some of these factors were not considered relevant in the 
circumstances of Vodafone 2. Perhaps some of them may be regarded as 
covered by the rather vague terms in which parts of the Chancellor’s 
guidance were expressed. However, these niceties can be lost when such 
guidance is repeated in the different context of other cases.63 On the whole, 
it is therefore better for national courts to work directly with the language 
used by the CJEU rather than translating it into language of the sort they 
61 Above n 50, para 199. 
62 Ibid, para 201. 
63 The criteria identified by Sir Andrew Morritt in Vodafone 2 and quoted by 
Lord Kerr in Robertson v Swift were reiterated by Lord Dyson in In the matter 
of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] UKSC 6, 
para 131. 
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would themselves have used, with the risk that something important will be 
lost in the process.64 
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of the principle of 
consistent interpretation, as well as the legislative antecedents of a legal act 
of the EU, in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority.65 That case 
concerned a challenge to the validity of a European Arrest Warrant issued 
by a Swedish prosecutor pursuant to an EU framework decision of 2002,66 
which had been implemented in the United Kingdom by the Extradition Act 
2003. The central question was whether the prosecutor constituted a 
‘judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the framework 
decision. Exceptionally, that question could not be referred to the CJEU 
because the United Kingdom had not accepted its jurisdiction over 
framework decisions at the material time.67 
64 The same issue arises when national courts attempt to summarise in 
their own words the effect of general principles of EU law, such as 
proportionality. See eg Lord Reed and Lord Toulson in R (Lumsdon) v Legal 
Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, paras 23-74. 
65 [2012] UKSC 22. See also Public Relations Consultants v Newspaper 
Licensing Society [2013] UKSC 18. 
66 Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190/20. 
67 See Article 35(2) of the pre-Lisbon version of the TEU; Lady Hale, para 
179; Lord Mance, para 198. 
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In seeking to establish the meaning of the term ‘judicial authority’, 
Lord Phillips referred to a range of materials in both English and French on 
the antecedents to and genesis of the framework decision, including the 
European Convention on Extradition of 1957 and an accompanying 
explanatory report.68 He concluded that the Swedish prosecutor constituted 
a judicial authority within the meaning of both Article 6(1) of the framework 
decision and the corresponding provision of the 2003 Act. Lord Mance also 
referred to the 1957 Convention and a variety of additional materials 
including the drafting history of the framework decision in French and 
German as well as English.69 He reached the same conclusion as Lord 
Phillips on Article 6(1), though for slightly different reasons. However, after 
an even more exhaustive examination of the background to the 2003 Act, 
Lord Mance concluded that, 
 
whatever may be the meaning of the Framework Decision as a matter 
of European law, the intention of Parliament and the effect of the 
Extradition Act 2003 was to restrict the recognition by British courts 
of incoming European arrest warrants to those issued by a judicial 
authority in the strict sense of a court, judge or magistrate.70 
 
68 See paras 16-59 of his judgment. 
69 See paras 226-233 and 239. 
70 Para 266. 
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This placed him in a dissenting minority of two with Lady Hale, whose short 
judgment betrayed a sense of relief that this was ‘not a case where 
Parliament has told us that we must disregard or interpret away the 
intention of the legislation.’71 
Lord Mance’s conclusion on the effect of the Extradition Act was 
facilitated by a point he uncovered concerning the very applicability of the 
principle of consistent interpretation in Assange. Article 34(2)(b) of Title VI of 
the pre-Lisbon TEU provided that framework decisions (a type of act which 
is now defunct) ‘shall not entail direct effect.’ This created doubt about 
whether they were covered by the principle of consistent interpretation. That 
doubt was removed in Pupino,72 where the CJEU ruled that national courts 
were indeed required to interpret their national law in the light of the 
wording and purpose of relevant framework decisions. The House of Lords 
had applied Pupino,73 believing it to be binding in the UK in the ordinary 
way under the European Communities Act 1972. However, in Assange Lord 
Mance demonstrated that this was not the case because framework 
decisions adopted under Title VI of the TEU were not covered by the 
‘Treaties’ as defined by section 1 of the 1972 Act. This meant that they fell 
outside the scope of section 2 of that Act, which would otherwise have given 
71 Para 194 of Lady Hale’s judgment. 
72 Case C-105/03 [2005] ECR I-5285. 
73 See Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [2007] UKHL 6; 
Caldarelli v Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Naples, Italy 
[2008] UKHL 51. 
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them legal effect. Lord Mance observed: ‘This is now, rightly, common 
ground between all parties to the present appeal. It is a constitutional 
point…and it has been overlooked in the previous case law.’74 The 
consequences of that extraordinary finding were limited only by the 
presumption that English law should comply with the UK’s international 
obligations and the demise of Title VI of the TEU in its pre-Lisbon form 
following the entry into force of the Treaty signed in that city on 1 December 
2009.75 
In some cases, the principle of consistent interpretation has led the 
Supreme Court to focus almost exclusively on the relevant EU provisions on 
the assumption that the overlapping domestic provisions were intended to 
mean, or may be interpreted as meaning, the same thing. In Public Relations 
Consultants v Newspaper Licensing Agency, for example, Lord Sumption 
said: ‘It is not disputed that the effect of the Directive and the English 
statutory instrument is the same, and it is convenient to refer to the terms 
of the Directive.’76 However, practice is not consistent. Airtours Holidays 
74 Para 210. Lord Mance acknowledged that he had sat in Dabas and agreed 
with the other speeches: Assange, above n 46, para 207. 
75 The pre-Lisbon scheme was preserved until 31 November 2014: Protocol 
(No 36) on transitional provisions, Article 10(3), annexed to the TEU and the 
TFEU 
76 [2013] UKSC 18, para 5. See also BT v Telefónica O2 [2014] UKSC 42, 
para 14 (Lord Sumption); Russell v Transocean International Resources, 
above n 43, para 22 (Lord Hope). For some older cases where a similar 
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Transport v HMRC77 involved the construction of the Value Added Tax Act 
1994, which gave effect to various EU directives on VAT. Giving the 
judgment of the majority, Lord Neuberger observed:78 
 
So far as the provisions of the 1994 Act are concerned, they must, of 
course, be interpreted as far as possible so as to comply with the 
current Directive, and it is accepted that, at least for present 
purposes, they do so. Whether it is right to decide this appeal by 
reference to the Principal VAT Directive or the 1994 Act is therefore a 
wholly academic point. However, the strictly correct approach must be 
to decide it by reference to the 1994 Act, but only on the basis that 
that Act cannot be interpreted without reference to the Principal VAT 
Directive, and must, if at all possible, be interpreted so as to be 
consistent with that Directive. 
 
This must be right, for deciding a case by reference to a directive rather than 
the national implementing measures is to treat the directive as if it were 
directly applicable, a quality possessed only by regulations. By-passing the 
implementing measures might perhaps be more likely to produce a result 
approach was adopted by lower courts, see A Arnull, The European Union 
and its Court of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed, 2006) 215-217. 
77 [2016] UKSC 21. See also Edenred v HM Treasury [2015] UKSC 45, para 
30 (Lord Hodge). 
78 Para 17. 
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consistent with EU law, but it is incompatible with the particular nature of 




There is complete acceptance by the Supreme Court of the need when 
interpreting provisions of EU law to compare different language versions. 
The principle of consistent interpretation is generally applied conscientiously 
by the Court, although there is a risk that the proper scope of that principle 
will be obscured by misleading paraphrases by domestic judges. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court sometimes goes further than strictly 
required by treating domestic provisions as if they comply with overlapping 
EU provisions without actually enquiring whether that outcome is 
compatible with the language used by the domestic draftsperson. 
 




When on 1 October 2009 the UK Supreme Court opened its doors for the 
first time, it sprang upon the legal world fully formed. It was to exercise 
essentially the same jurisdiction as its predecessor, the House of Lords,79 to 
which nearly all its first Justices had immediately beforehand belonged. 
79 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 40. 
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Between UK accession to the European Communities in January 1973 and 
the demise of the House of Lords on 30 September 2009, it made 40 
references to the CJEU.80  Eleven of these were made over the last seven 
years of its existence. By contrast, the Supreme Court had made 16 
references by the end of 2016.81 
The number of references made by a court is affected by a range of 
factors, some of which will lie outside its control.82 It is therefore only a 
partial guide to a court’s willingness to engage with the preliminary rulings 
procedure. Be that as it may, this is a context in which volume matters. The 
more references a national court makes, the more it is able to educate the 
CJEU about the national context in which it operates and the greater its 
potential influence on the development of EU law. 
Nor should it be thought that making a reference deprives the national 
court of any control over the subsequent course of the proceedings. Bobek 
maintains that the voice of the national court is ‘determinative’: the CJEU 
‘will always be bound by the facts and the way in which these are 
interpreted by the national court, as well as the picture it receives from the 
national court about the interpretation of national law.’ Although the CJEU 
sometimes reformulates questions submitted to it, it is influenced by the 
80 See Arnull above n 4. 
81 Figures supplied by the CJEU. 
82 See Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, ch 2. 
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terms in which they are framed initially by the national court.83 Moreover, 
guidance published by the CJEU encourages national courts to suggest 
answers to their own questions.84 It is, of course, the national court that 
applies the ruling of the CJEU to the facts of the case. 
The slight increase in the reference rate since the establishment of the 
Supreme Court is therefore welcome, even if the UK’s days as a full member 




(i) Positive Engagement 
 
Cases which reach the Supreme Court will already have involved the 
expenditure of much time and effort. No-one will wish to incur the further 
delay and expense entailed by a reference to the CJEU85 if a satisfactory 
83 M Bobek, ‘Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court 
of Justice through the Eyes of National Courts’ in M Adams, H de Waele, J 
Meeusen and G Straetmans (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy 
of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Oxford, Hart, 2013) 197, 
223. 
84 Para 17, Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals, in Relation 
to the Initiation of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, OJ 2016 C 439/1. 
85 15 months on average in 2016, the latest year for which figures were 
available at the time of writing. 
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result can be achieved without taking that step. Be that as it may, the 
Supreme Court has often engaged positively with the CJEU though the 
reference procedure. A good example of healthy dialogue is Test Claimants in 
the Franked Investment Group Litigation v HMRC,86 a complicated and long-
running dispute involving very large sums of money. It concerned the 
compatibility with the Treaty free movement rules of the tax treatment of 
dividends received by UK resident companies from non-resident 
subsidiaries. Two remedies were potentially available to the claimants: a 
claim for restitution of tax demanded unlawfully and a claim for tax paid 
under a mistake of law. Parliament had reduced without notice and with 
retroactive effect an extended limitation period applicable to the second of 
those remedies. In the Supreme Court, there was a division of opinion on 
two questions: was this compatible with EU law and did it made any 
difference that, when the taxpayer brought its claim under the mistake 
cause of action, it had been recognized only recently and had yet to be 
confirmed by the highest domestic court. Those questions were therefore 
referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
The case is notable for the depth of the analysis of EU law conducted 
by the Justices who took part in it and their willingness to make a reference 
in proceedings which had already been the subject of two references by the 
86 [2012] UKSC 19. Other good examples are Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of 
State [2012] UKSC 49 and British Airways v Williams [2010] UKSC 16. 
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High Court.87 While those references were each dealt with by the Grand 
Chamber, the third was assigned to a five-Judge chamber, which answered 
yes to the first question and no to the second.88 The case is an example of 
strict compliance by the Court with its obligations under the third 
paragraph of Article 267. 
 
(ii) Sub-Optimal Engagement 
 
The success of the preliminary rulings procedure depends not only on the 
national court but also on the CJEU, which must deliver clear and 
persuasive rulings which identify and respond to the issues of concern to 
the national court. A helpful ruling helps to build confidence in the CJEU as 
a reliable interlocutor, while obscure or unhelpful rulings may have the 
opposite effect. 
An example of litigation in which the role played by the CJEU was less 
than ideal is the saga of Declan O’Byrne (OB), a child who suffered brain 
87 Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue [2006] ECR I-11753, EU:C:2006:774; Case C-35/11 Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue and 
The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs EU:C:2012:707. 
88 Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group 
Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs EU:C:2013:834. For the subsequent course 
of the proceedings, see [2017] 1 Common Market Law Reports 57. 
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damage following a vaccine he received at a doctor’s surgery. The ensuing 
proceedings raised questions about the effect of the product liability 
directive89 and generated two references, one from the High Court and one 
from the House of Lords. The final judgment was given by the Supreme 
Court. 
Article 1 of the product liability directive makes producers liable for 
damage caused by defects in their products. Article 3(1) states that the term 
‘producer’ includes ‘the manufacturer of a finished product…’ Article 3(3) 
adds: ‘Where the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier 
of the product shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured 
person, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the 
person who supplied him with the product…’ According to Article 11, 
liability ceases 10 years after ‘the producer put into circulation the actual 
product which caused the damage…’ 
OB brought two actions for damages in the High Court. In the first, 
the defendant was the company believed to be the producer of the vaccine. It 
subsequently transpired that it was in fact a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
producer, so OB brought a second action in the High Court against the true 
producer, the parent company. In addition, he sought an order substituting 
the parent company for the subsidiary as defendant in the first action. The 
High Court made a reference to the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 11. 
89 Directive 85/374 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products, OJ 1985 L210/29. 
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It sought clarification of when a product was ‘put into circulation’ and the 
circumstances, if any, in which Member States were permitted to allow a 
party to be substituted in proceedings governed by the directive. 
The approach of the five Judges of the first chamber of the CJEU was 
nuanced. A product was to be regarded as having been put into circulation 
‘when it leaves the production process operated by the producer and enters 
a marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the public in order 
to be used or consumed.’90 The CJEU accepted that close links between the 
producer in the strict sense and another entity might mean that the concept 
of producer within the meaning of the directive encompassed both. On the 
question of substitution, the CJEU said that this was ‘as a rule for national 
law to determine’91 but added that a national court considering such a 
substitution must ‘ensure that due regard is had to the personal scope of 
the Directive, as determined by Articles 1 and 3 thereof.’ 
Following that ruling, the High Court substituted the parent for the 
subsidiary in the first action. The parent appealed unsuccessfully to the 
Court of Appeal and thereafter to the House of Lords.92 Four of the Law 
Lords were minded to dismiss the appeal, but one of them, Lord Rodger, 
persuaded them that there was room for doubt about the precise effect of 
the CJEU’s ruling. It was therefore decided that a further reference should 
90 Case C-127/04 Declan O'Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD [2006] ECR I-1313, 
EU:C:2006:93, para 27 of the judgment. 
91 Para 39. 
92 OB v Aventis Pasteur SA [2008] UKHL 34. 
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be made. The CJEU assigned the second reference to the Grand Chamber,93 
which held that it was incompatible with Article 11 of the directive for 
national law on the substitution of parties to allow a producer ‘to be sued, 
after the expiry of the period prescribed by that article, as defendant in 
proceedings brought within that period against another person.’94 However, 
it qualified that basic rule in two ways. First, it said that that, in 
proceedings brought within the ten-year deadline against a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the producer, the national court was at liberty to substitute 
that producer for the subsidiary if it found that the producer had 
determined when the product was to be put into circulation. Secondly, 
where the person injured by an allegedly defective product was not 
reasonably able to identify its producer before commencing proceedings 
against its supplier, that supplier could be treated as a producer if it did not 
promptly inform the injured person of the identity of the producer or its own 
supplier. The CJEU’s judgment therefore left much to the discretion of the 
referring court. 
The ruling of the CJEU fell to be applied by the Supreme Court,95 
which had in the meantime replaced the House of Lords. The judgment of 
93 Case C-358/08 Aventis Pasteur SA v OB [2009] ECR I-11305, 
EU:C:2009:744. 
94 Para 62. 
95 OB v Aventis Pasteur [2010] UKSC 23. 
Page 35 of 90 
 
                                                          
the Court was given by none other than Lord Rodger.96 He allowed the 
appeal and set aside the order of the High Court substituting the parent for 
the subsidiary.97 While his judgment contained an exhaustive examination 
of the two judgments of the CJEU, it did not address directly the question 
whether the qualifications to the basic rule identified by the CJEU in its 
second judgment could be applied in the circumstances of this case.  
It is always unsatisfactory when two references have to be made in the 
same national proceedings in order to establish the position in EU law. This 
is particularly so when the second reference is needed to resolve obscurity 
or ambiguity in the CJEU’s first judgment.98 The central problem with the 
first judgment in this case was that it failed to elaborate on the personal 
scope of the directive under Article 3 or make clear what weight the referring 
court was to give to the matter. Although it examined the possible links 
between the parent and the subsidiary, it did so only in the course of 
96 The panel of five Justices included three others who had been members of 
the House of Lords which made the second reference to the CJEU. 
97 See Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, ‘Dissenting Judgments’ in A 
Burrows, D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in 
Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 33. 
98 See further T Tridimas, ‘Constitutional Review of Member State Action: 
the Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’ (2011) 9 I·CON 737; V 
Heyvaert, J Thornton and R Drabble, ‘With Reference to the Environment: 
the Preliminary Reference Procedure, Environmental Decisions and the 
Domestic Judiciary’ (2014) Law Quarterly Review 413, 428-430. 
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answering the referring court’s first question, concerning when a product 
was to be regarded as having been put into circulation. It did not explore the 
implications of those links for Article 3. If the case reflects poorly on the 
CJEU, it reveals considerable conscientiousness on the part of the House of 
Lords, which resolved to seek clarification of the CJEU’s first judgment 




The Supreme Court has so far maintained a slightly higher reference rate 
than the House of Lords. It has shown itself to be willing to engage 
constructively with the CJEU, even in cases where references have already 
been made. The guidance it has received from the CJEU, however, has 
sometimes been found wanting. This issue is pursued in section VI. 
 
V. Avoiding References 
  
A feature of the Supreme Court’s case law on the question whether to make 
a reference to the CJEU is the absence of routine and systematic analysis of 
the extent to which the CILFIT criteria are met. In cases where the Court 
decides to make a reference, it is perhaps natural for it not to feel a need to 
99 Another case where a reference was made (this time by the Supreme 
Court itself) because a minority regarded the position as unclear was 
Secretary of State v Vomero [2016] UKSC 49; [2017] 1 CMLR 3.  
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articulate detailed reasons for its decision to take that step.100 However, 
some account of its reasons is desirable in the interests of transparency and 
the proper development of the case law. Of greater importance, however, are 
cases where a reference might have been made but the Supreme Court 
chose not do so. In these circumstances, a full analysis of why it thought it 
was not bound to refer might be expected. It is in cases of this type that 
reasons are required by Article 6(1) ECHR101 and were considered necessary 
by Advocate General Bot in Ferreira da Silva e Brito.102 
 
A. Failure to Consider a Reference 
 
In a significant number of cases where difficult questions of EU law have 
had to be addressed, little or no consideration seems to have been given to 
whether a reference was required.103 An example is R (EM (Eritrea)) v 
100 In MB v Secretary of State [2016] UKSC 53, the reasoning consisted of a 
single sentence: see para 17. 
101 See above, n 41. 
102 See Krommendijk, above n 41, 59-61. 
103 Eg HMRC v Secret Hotels2 [2014] UKSC 16; Stott v Thomas Cook [2014] 
UKSC 15; Deutsche Bahn v Morgan Advanced Materials [2014] UKSC 24; 
Amoena v HMRC [2016] UKSC 41; Airtours Holidays Transport v HMRC 
[2016 UKSC 21. 
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Secretary of State,104 which raised questions about the effect of the so-called 
Dublin II regulation.105 This laid down a general rule that, where asylum 
was sought by a person present within the EU, the application should be 
dealt with by the Member State in which the asylum seeker had first arrived. 
If the person concerned later moved to another Member State, that state was 
entitled to return him or her to the first state. The question that arose in EM 
was whether return to the state of arrival could be resisted if it could be 
shown that it would expose the asylum seeker to a risk that his or her 
fundamental rights would be infringed. 
That question was addressed by the CJEU in NS,106 where it declared: 
 
if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic 
flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum 
104 [2014] UKSC 12. See also HMRC v Pendragon [2015] UKSC 37; TN and 
MA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State [2015] UKSC 40; R v McGeough [2015] 
UKSC 62. Cf Cavendish Square Holding v Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, 
where the question of a reference was considered only in the dissenting 
judgment of Lord Toulson (para 315). 
105 Regulation 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 
OJ 2003 L 50/1. 
106 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 [2011] ECR I-13905, 
EU:C:2011:865, para 86. 
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applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or 
degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter [of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU], of asylum seekers transferred to the 
territory of that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible 
with that provision. 
 
In EM, Lord Kerr (giving the judgment of the Court) observed:107 
 
an exclusionary rule based only on systemic failures would be 
arbitrary both in conception and in practice. There is nothing 
intrinsically significant about a systemic failure which marks it out as 
one where the violation of fundamental rights is more grievous or 
more deserving of protection…gross violations of article 3 [ECHR] 
rights can occur without there being any systemic failure whatsoever. 
 
Lord Kerr concluded that, where it could be shown ‘that the conditions in 
which an asylum seeker will be required to live if returned under Dublin II 
are such that there is a real risk that he will be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, his removal to that state is forbidden.’108 No 
consideration appears to have been given to whether a preliminary ruling 
should be sought, even though NS was a decision of the Grand Chamber, 
107 Para 48. 
108 Para 63. Cf the test laid down by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Soering v United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, judgment of 7 July 1989, para 91. 
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the effectiveness of a central plank of the EU’s asylum policy was at stake 
and the Court of Appeal had taken a different view. The failure of the 
Supreme Court to refer deprived the CJEU of an opportunity to review its 
previous ruling and put at risk the uniform application of the regulation.109 
The possibility of a reference was not discussed in R (Miller) v 
Secretary of State,110 even though the meaning of a Treaty provision, Article 
50 TEU, was fundamental to the outcome.111 The central question in Miller 
was whether notice of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant 
to Article 50 could be given by ministers in the exercise of their prerogative 
powers without legislative authorisation by Parliament. The case was heard 
by the Supreme Court sitting for the first time in a plenary formation of 11 
109 Regulation 343/2003 was recast as Regulation 604/2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ 2013 L 
180/31 (the Dublin III regulation). Article 3(2) of the Dublin III regulation 
reproduces the test laid down in NS, but the CJEU held in Case C-578/16 
PPU CK v Republika Slovenija EU:C:2017:127 that the test applicable under 
the new regulation was less stringent. 
110 [2017] UKSC 5. 
111 See P Allott, 'Taking Stock of the Legal Fallout from the EU (Notification 
of Withdrawal) Act 2017', UK Constitutional Law Blog (2nd Feb 2017) 
(available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 
Page 41 of 90 
 
                                                          
Justices.112 By a majority of eight to three, the Court held that the answer to 
that central question was ‘no’: an Act of Parliament was needed to give the 
government authority to notify the European Council of the UK’s decision to 
withdraw from the EU. The majority113 took the view that the European 
Communities Act 1972 ‘effectively constitutes EU law as an entirely new, 
independent and overriding source of domestic law, and the Court of Justice 
as a source of binding judicial decisions about its meaning.’ It was ‘a 
conduit pipe’ by which EU law was brought into domestic law. On 
withdrawal, EU law would ‘cease to be a source of domestic law for the 
future…’114 They declared:115 
 
It would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principle 
for such a far-reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements 
to be brought about by ministerial decision or ministerial action alone. 
All the more so when the source in question was brought into 
existence by Parliament through primary legislation, which gave that 
112 In principle, the full Court comprises 12 Justices, but at the time there 
was a vacancy. 
113 Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord 
Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge. Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and Lord 
Hughes dissented. 
114 Para 80. 
115 Para 81. The Court was unanimous in holding that the devolved 
legislatures did not need to be consulted: paras 126-151. 
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source an overriding supremacy in the hierarchy of domestic law 
sources. 
 
The Court did not subject Article 50 to detailed analysis. Three issues were 
not in dispute between the parties: (a) that the result of the 2016 
referendum did not itself constitute a decision by the UK to withdraw from 
the EU; (b) that the European Union Referendum Act 2015 under which the 
referendum had been held did not itself authorise notification of intention to 
withdraw under Article 50(2);116 and (c) that notice under Article 50(2) 
‘cannot be given in qualified or conditional terms and that, once given, it 
cannot be withdrawn.’117 While the first two issues seem uncontroversial, 
the same cannot be said of the third. Both the majority118 and Lord 
Carnwath (dissenting)119 recognised that this might not be the effect of 
Article 50(2). The majority stated: ‘we are content to proceed on the basis 
that that is correct, without expressing any view of our own on either point. 
It follows from this that once the United Kingdom gives Notice, it will 
inevitably cease at a later date to be a member of the European Union and a 
party to the EU Treaties.’ The inevitability of that outcome was crucial to the 
applicants’ argument that the giving of notice would necessarily mean that 
legal rights they enjoyed under EU law would come to an end. Without 
116 Para 171 (Lord Reed). 
117 Majority judgment, para 26. 
118 Para 26. 
119 Para 261. 
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parliamentary enabling legislation, this would mean that the law had been 
altered by executive action, which was unlawful. 
It might have been thought that this issue needed to be resolved 
before judgment could be given and should therefore have been referred to 
the CJEU. This possibility was not in the interests of any of the principal 
actors. If it turned out that notice under Article 50(2) was revocable or might 
be qualified, the government could have faced constant harrying from its 
political opponents for information about the progress of the negotiations 
that might lead to calls for them to be halted or suspended. It would not 
have wished to conduct a potentially difficult additional debate about 
whether, and if so how, notice might be qualified. For the applicants, their 
argument about the constitutional significance of invoking Article 50 would 
have been undermined. So the Supreme Court dealt with the case on the 
basis of an assumption about the legal position which it knew might be 
incorrect but without deciding one way or the other what the correct legal 
position was. As a matter of judicial politics, the idea of involving in a 
primarily domestic dispute an institution of the very organisation the UK 
wished to leave would have seemed very unattractive.120 As a matter of law, 
120 On the revocability of notice given under Art 50, see House of Lords EU 
Committee, ‘The process of withdrawing from the European Union’ (11th 
Report of Session 2015–16, HL Paper 138) paras 6-17, referring to evidence 
given by D Edward and D Wyatt. Crowd-funded proceedings have been 
brought in the Irish High Court by UK barrister Jolyon Maugham QC with a 
view to seeking clarification from the CJEU on this point. 
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however, neither the convenience of the parties nor the fact that they are in 
agreement absolves an apex court of the obligation to refer.121 For the 
purposes of the case, the Supreme Court decided a question of EU law the 
answer to which it knew to be unclear. It should therefore have made a 
reference to the CJEU. 
 
B. Reference Considered but Rejected 
 
There is a large number of cases where the question whether a preliminary 
ruling should be sought was considered but no reference made.122 The 
Supreme Court has given a variety of reasons to explain this outcome. They 
include: that the Court considers the question to be acte clair or éclairé; to 
avoid further delay; that neither party has requested a reference; that the 
case involves not the meaning of the law but its application to the facts, a 
matter within the jurisdiction of the national court; and that it appears on 
analysis that the point in issue does not need to be resolved in the 
circumstances of the case. In one case, it was even doubted whether the 
121 See Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 252-3. 
122 Eg Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6; Morge v 
Hampshire County Council [2011] UKSC 2; Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] 
UKSC 44; PMS International Group v Magmatic [2016] UKSC 12; Re N 
(Children) [2016] UKSC 15; R (Nouazli) v Secretary of State [2016] UKSC 16; 
Moreno v Motor Insurer’s Bureau [2016] UKSC 52 (which contains what may 
be the Supreme Court’s first reference to Brexit: see para 2). 
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CJEU ‘would feel able to provide any greater or different assistance than we 
have here sought to give.’123 Individual Justices may give different reasons 
or a range of reasons for reaching the conclusion that a reference is not 
necessary.  
 
(i) Application of Law to Facts/Acte Eclairé 
 
The possibility of a reference was considered but rejected in HS2.124 That 
case involved a challenge to a government decision to proceed with the 
construction of a high-speed train link known as HS2 from London to the 
north of England. The case raised two main issues: should the decision have 
been preceded by a strategic environmental assessment under Directive 
2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes 
on the environment;125 and the compatibility with Directive 2011/92 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment126 of the proposed use of the hybrid bill procedure.127 This, the 
123 Morge, ibid, para 25 (Lord Brown). 
124 Above n 49. 
125 OJ 2001 L 197/30. 
126 OJ 2012 L 26/1. 
127 A hybrid bill is one which affects the general public but also has a 
significant impact on specific individuals or groups: 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/hybrid/  (accessed 25 
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appellant said, would prevent effective public participation due to the 
imposition of the government whip and collective ministerial responsibility 
at an important stage of the parliamentary process. The appeal was 
unanimously dismissed. 
Lord Carnwath (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, 
Lord Sumption and Lord Reed agreed) focused on the first issue and 
concluded that a reference to the CJEU was unnecessary. The case was in 
his view concerned principally with the application of the law to the facts, 
and in particular to the workings of the parliamentary process. The existing 
case law of the CJEU provided sufficient guidance. 
Lord Reed (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord 
Kerr, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed) focused on the second 
issue. He observed:128 
 
The argument presented on behalf of the appellants as to the 
implications of the EIA Directive [2011/92], if well founded, impinges 
upon long established constitutional principles governing the 
relationship between Parliament and the courts, as reflected for 
example in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, in authorities 
concerned with judicial scrutiny of Parliamentary procedure…and in 
other cases concerned with judicial scrutiny of decisions whether to 
May 2017). For more detail, see the judgment of Lord Reed at paras 57 and 
58. 
128 Para 78. 
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introduce a bill in Parliament… [I]t follows that the appellants’ 
contentions potentially raise a question as to the extent, if any, to 
which these principles may have been implicitly qualified or abrogated 
by the European Communities Act 1972. 
 
Lord Reed added that the issue could not be resolved ‘simply by applying the 
doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the supremacy of EU law, since 
the application of that doctrine in our law itself depends upon the 1972 
Act.’129 However, he concluded that the proposed parliamentary process was 
a substantive one in which Parliament’s role would be more than merely 
formal. Like Lord Carnwath, Lord Reed thought the case involved the 
application of principles that had been clearly established in the case law of 
the CJEU. No reference was therefore required. 
 
(ii) Varied Reasoning 
 
An example of a case where a variety of reasons for not referring was given 
is Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National.130 The issue was the extent to 
which the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) could challenge the fairness of 
129 Para 79. 
130 [2009] UKSC 6. See A Arnull, ‘Keeping their heads above water? 
European Law in the House of Lords’ in J Lee (ed), From House of Lords to 
Supreme Court: Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Oxford, Hart, 
2011)129, 143-147. 
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certain charges imposed by the respondent banks on their customers 
pursuant to standard terms agreed between them. The case turned on the 
effect of regulations introduced to give effect to Directive 93/13 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.131 Article 4(2) of that directive provided that, 
when assessing the fairness of a contractual term, no account should be 
taken of ‘the adequacy of the price and remuneration…as against the 
services or goods supplie[d] in exchange…’ Article 6(2) of the implementing 
regulations was in similar terms and the two provisions were treated as 
having the same effect. As Lord Phillips explained,132 the question was 
whether the contested charges constituted the price or remuneration for 
the services supplied by the banks. 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had concluded that 
regulation 6(2) did not have the effect of limiting the assessment of 
fairness that the OFT was entitled to carry out. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. However, even though the CJEU had yet to rule on the scope of 
Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, it declined to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling. 
The question whether the Court was obliged to make a reference 
was discussed by Lord Walker, Lord Phillips, Lord Mance and Lord 
Neuberger. Lord Walker noted133 that neither side had shown any 
enthusiasm for a reference because of the further delay that would be 
131 OJ 1993 L 95/29. 
132 See para 57 of his judgment. 
133 Paras 48-50. 
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entailed. He took the view that, if the Court was unanimous that the 
appeal should be allowed, the point should be treated as acte clair without 
a reference. This was a case where in his opinion the lower courts were 
clearly wrong. In any event, the application of Article 4(2) to the facts was 
a matter for national law. Lord Mance agreed that the decisive issue could 
properly be regarded as acte clair. Lord Phillips did not, but accepted that 
a reference ‘would not be appropriate’.134 Lord Neuberger considered it 
possible that the CJEU would agree with the Court of Appeal. Had the 
issue needed to be resolved, he would therefore ‘very reluctantly, have 
concluded that a reference was required.’135 However, he did not think the 
issue did need to be resolved for the purpose of the appeal.136 
It is axiomatic that neither the wishes of the parties nor the delay a 
reference would cause are relevant to the scope of the obligation imposed by 
Article 267 on national courts of last resort. An apex court mindful of its 
Treaty obligations might have seen the fact that it disagreed with a lower 
court as evidence that ‘there is involved a question of interpretation on 
which judicial minds can differ’, as Lord Diplock put it in Henn and 
Darby,137 and as militating in favour of a reference. 138 The outcome of 
134 Para 91 of the judgment. 
135 Para 120. 
136 The fifth Justice, Lady Hale, did not express a view of her own on 
whether or not a reference should be made. 
137 [1980] 2 All ER 166, 197. 
138 Cf Ferreira da Silva e Brito, above n 22, paras 41-45. 
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Abbey National was determined essentially by the term ‘price and 
remuneration’ in Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13. In order to apply that term 
to the facts, its proper meaning self-evidently needed to be established 
first.139 
 
(iii) Alternative Basis for Resolution 
 
Abbey National illustrates a general enthusiasm on the part of the Supreme 
Court for declaring references unnecessary because a question of EU law is 
acte clair.140 Even where cases are not considered acte clair (or éclairé), 
however, references may still be avoided. In Re A (A Child),141 the Supreme 
Court concluded that a question of EU law did not need to be resolved 
because the case could be dealt with on an alternative basis. As Lady Hale 
139 The difficulty of drawing a clear dividing line between the interpretation 
of the law and its application was acknowledged by Lord Reed and Lord 
Toulson in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, para 30. 
140 See also Russell v Transocean International Resources, above n 43; X v 
Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau [2012] UKSC 59; Goluchowski v District 
Court in Elblag, Poland [2016] UKSC 36; [2016] 3 CMLR 39. 
141 [2013] UKSC 60. See A Verdan, J Renton and M Gration, ‘In the Matter of 
A (Children) [2013] UKSC 60 – An Analysis’ 
http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed117049 (accessed 25 May 
2017). Cf I (A Child) [2009] UKSC 10. See also BT v Telefónica O2 [2014] 
UKSC 42. 
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(with whom the majority of the Court agreed) explained, at issue was 
whether the High Court could order the return to the UK of a child who had 
never been there on the basis that he had British nationality or was 
habitually resident in the UK. Of relevance to the question of habitual 
residence was Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility.142 If the case could have been resolved 
only on the basis of the habitual residence of the child, a reference to the 
CJEU on the meaning of the regulation would have been necessary. 
However, it was possible that the High Court would be able to resolve the 
case on the basis of the child’s nationality under its inherent jurisdiction at 
common law. Only if the High Court decided not to do this would it be 
necessary to address the question of the child’s habitual residence. The case 
was therefore remitted to the High Court for urgent consideration as to 
whether its inherent jurisdiction should be exercised. 
This case displays distinct reluctance to involve the CJEU. A supreme 
national court remains subject to the obligation to refer even where a ruling 
it proposes to give will not bring an end to the proceedings.143 The High 
Court had already decided to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that the child 
was habitually resident in the UK. Its inherent jurisdiction had not been 
considered. Lady Hale acknowledged that ‘extreme circumspection’ was 
142 OJ 2003 L 338/1. 
143 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013, 
EU:C:1997:517; Guiot, above n 20, 598. 
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needed before exercising that jurisdiction144 and set out ‘a number of 
important general considerations which may militate against its exercise’145 
before offering several countervailing factors. The case was urgent, however, 
and the Supreme Court doubtless calculated that the High Court would take 
advantage of the steer it had been given promptly. If so, its calculation 
proved correct, for just under a month later the High Court exercised its 
jurisdiction on the basis of the child’s nationality and ordered his return to 
the UK.146 Even though the urgent preliminary ruling procedure (PPU)147 
would have been available to the CJEU had a reference been made on the 
meaning of Regulation 2201/2003, cases heard under that procedure were 
at that time being decided on average in 2.2 months. Moreover, a national 
court requesting the use of the procedure cannot be certain that its request 
will be granted.148 
 
(iv) Proceedings Pending in Another Forum 
 
It is not uncommon for issues of EU law in play before the Supreme Court to 
have been raised in another forum, such as the CJEU in infringement 
144 Para 65. 
145 Para 64. 
146 A v A [2013] EWHC 3298. 
147 ‘Procédure préjudicielle d’urgence’. See Article 107, Rules of Procedure of 
the CJEU. 
148 Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, Article 108. 
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proceedings against a Member State under Article 258 TFEU or the national 
courts of another Member State. Where such proceedings are brought to the 
attention of the Supreme Court, it may be asked to await their outcome 
before giving judgment or deciding whether to make a reference itself. 
As a matter of EU law, the CJEU made it clear in Gomes Valente v 
Fazenda Pública149 that ‘the fact that the Commission discontinues 
infringement proceedings against a Member State concerning a piece of 
legislation has no effect on the obligation upon a court of last instance of 
that Member State to refer to the Court of Justice…a question of [Union] law 
in relation to the legislation concerned.’150 Where a reference has previously 
been made by a court of a Member State, the ruling of the CJEU may resolve 
the matter and remove the need for it to be the subject of a further 
reference, as the CJEU acknowledged in CILFIT. Where two references 
‘concerning the same subject-matter’ are made in quick succession, the 
CJEU may give a single judgment dealing with both.151 However, this will 
149 Case C-393/98 [2001] ECR I-1327, EU:C:2001:109, para 15. 
150 Para 19. See further Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 246-8. 
151 Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, Art 54. See eg Joined Cases C–46/93 
and C–48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I–1029;  
EU:C:1996:79 (where one case came from Germany and the other from the 
UK); Joined Cases C-53/09 and C-55/09 HMRC v Loyalty Management UK 
Ltd and Baxi Group Ltd [2010] ECR I-9187, EU:C:2010:590 (where both 
references came from the UK). 
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not be possible where ‘the connection between them’152 is not sufficiently 
close. As we have seen, there is nothing to stop national courts from making 
two (or more) references in the same case.153 
Following the ruling of the CJEU in R (Edwards) v Environment 
Agency154 and oral submissions from the parties, the Supreme Court agreed 
to defer judgment until it had received the Opinion of the Advocate General 
in related infringement proceedings against the UK (which had been 
assigned to the same Advocate General).155 When the Supreme Court came 
to give judgment,156 Lord Carnwath (giving the judgment of the Court) said 
that the replies given by the CJEU to the questions referred to it ‘failed to 
offer a simple or straightforward answer’ to ‘one of the main issues raised by 
152 Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, Art 54. 
153. Case 69/85 Wünsche v Germany [1986] ECR 947, EU:C:1986:104, para 
15. For examples, see Pierik, Case 117/77 [1978] ECR 825 and Case 182/78 
[1979] ECR 1977; Foglia v Novello, Case 104/79 [1980] ECR 745 and 
Case 244/80 [1981] ECR 3045; CILFIT, Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415 and 
Case 77/83 [1984] ECR 1257; Francovich, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 
[1991] ECR I-5357 and Case C-479/93 [1995] ECR I-3843; Factortame, Case 
C-213/89 [1990] ECR I-2433, Case C-221/89 [1991] ECR I-3905 and Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029. 
154 Above n 43. 
155 For the Opinion, see EU:C:2013:554 (AG Kokott). 
156 R (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No 2) [2013] UKSC 78. 
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the reference.’157 The appellant suggested that if the Court had any doubt 
about the implications of the CJEU’s ruling and the Advocate General’s 
Opinions, it should wait until the infringement proceedings had been 
resolved.158 Lord Carnwath did not consider this ‘necessary or desirable.’ 
Noting that the case had already been long delayed, he observed: ‘there is 
nothing in the Advocate General’s later opinion, in my view, which suggests 
that more definitive guidance for the purposes of the present case is to be 
expected from the forthcoming judgment.’159 He proceeded to make the long 
awaited order for costs. 
In Patmalniece v Secretary of State,160 the issue was whether the 
conditions of entitlement to state pension credit were compatible with the 
rule against discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 
3(1) of Regulation 1408/71 on social security.161 A few months before the 
case was heard by the Supreme Court, the Commission launched 
157 Para 31. At para 23 of his judgment, Lord Carnwath referred to the 
German text of the CJEU’s judgment in attempting to elucidate the English 
text. 
158 Case C-530/11 Commission v United Kingdom EU:C:2014:67. 
159 Para 38. 
160 [2011] UKSC 11. 
161 Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ 
1971 L 149/2, has now been replaced by Regulation 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, OJ 2004 L 200/1. 
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infringement proceedings against the UK which covered the disputed 
conditions of entitlement. It was argued by an intervener that this showed 
that the issue in dispute was not acte clair. However, Lord Hope observed 
that the Commission had not yet issued an opinion on the alleged 
infringement. He went on: ‘In these circumstances I would not draw any 
conclusions either one way or the other from these developments.’ No 
reference was made. 
It has been persuasively argued that national courts of last resort 
should not invoke the acte clair doctrine in cases where the issue at stake is 
the subject of infringement proceedings brought by the Commission.162 It is 
true that such proceedings are often settled without a judgment of the Court 
and that occasionally this may be because the Member State has persuaded 
the Commission to withdraw its complaint. However, this merely serves to 
confirm that the disputed issue is not acte clair. In Edwards the Supreme 
Court should therefore have waited for the infringement proceedings to be 
resolved before giving judgment, while Patmalniece should have been 
referred to the CJEU. If the related infringement proceedings had also been 
brought before the CJEU, it might have been able to deal with the two cases 
at the same time. 
A reference should also have been made in Re N (Children),163 another 
case concerning Regulation 2201/2003 on matrimonial matters and 
162 Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 247-248; Guiot, above n 20, 604. 
163 [2016] UKSC 15. 
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parental responsibility.164 The general rule laid down by Article 8 of that 
Regulation in matters of parental responsibility is that jurisdiction belongs 
to the courts of the Member State where the child is habitually resident. 
However, Article 15 makes provision for the matter to be transferred to a 
court of another Member State by way of exception where certain conditions 
are met. Re N concerned two little girls born in England to Hungarian 
parents. Although both girls had Hungarian nationality, they had lived all 
their lives in England. They were both now living with foster carers. One of 
the issues the Supreme Court had to decide was whether Article 15 applied 
to public law care proceedings. That question and others relevant to Re N 
had been referred to the CJEU by the Irish Supreme Court in Child and 
Family Agency v JD,165 which was pending when the UK Supreme Court 
gave judgment. Lady Hale (giving the judgment of the Court) said166 the 
question whether Article 15 applied to public law proceedings ‘cannot be 
regarded as acte clair. This court has to decide whether to make its own 
reference of essentially the same question that the Supreme Court of Ireland 
has already referred; whether to delay its decision until the outcome of that 
reference is known; or whether to proceed on the assumption that article 15 
is capable of applying to public law proceedings and review the decisions of 
the courts below on their merits.’ She found the third option ‘infinitely 
preferable to the other two’ as ‘[t]hese proceedings have already taken far too 
164 Above, n 142. 
165 Case C-428/15 EU:C:2016:819. 
166 Para 54. 
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long.’ The best interests of the girls ‘demand that their future should be 
decided as soon as possible.’167 She therefore said that she would ‘proceed 
on the basis that the meaning of article 15.1 is acte clair, albeit not yet 
éclairé, and we are merely applying it to the facts of the case, which is the 
task of the national courts.’ 
The option favoured by Lady Hale should have been avoided, for it 
involved a clear breach of the obligation to refer. However, each of the other 
options suffered from disadvantages. An immediate reference would have 
involved a further delay of something of the order of 15 months. That period 
could have been shortened by recourse to the PPU, but the CJEU might not 
have acceded to a request that this should be done. Waiting for the ruling of 
the CJEU in the JD case involved a risk that it might not be framed 
sufficiently broadly to cover the circumstances of Re N. In that event, a 
reference would have been required at that point. The best solution 
compatible with the Treaty would have been for the Supreme Court to make 
an immediate reference with a view to withdrawing it if its questions were 
answered in JD. Its reference should have been accompanied by a request 
that the PPU should be used.168 
In the event, the judgment of the CJEU in JD was given over six 
months later. It substantially endorsed the conclusion reached by Lady Hale 
on the correct interpretation of the Regulation. An application by the 
167 Para 55. 
168 This would admittedly not have been without drawbacks in terms of 
additional work and expense. 
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referring court for the PPU to be used was rejected by the CJEU, although it 
did agree to give the case priority over others.169 
 
(v) Legacy Issues 
 
The Supreme Court declined to make a reference in extraordinary 
circumstances in HMRC v Aimia Coalition Loyalty UK Ltd,170 a VAT case 
involving a well-known loyalty card scheme. A reference to the CJEU had been 
made by the House of Lords. It fell to the Supreme Court to apply the CJEU’s 
ruling.171 The CJEU had joined the case with a separate one referred by the 
House of Lords at the same time about another loyalty scheme, though one of 
what Lord Reed called ‘an entirely different character…’172 The CJEU decided 
the cases without an Advocate General’s Opinion. As Lord Reed noted, this 
meant that it did not consider them to raise any new point of law.173 Lord 
Reed also noted a comment by the CJEU about the limited scope of the 
169 See Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, Article 53(3). 
170 [2013] UKSC 15. For an acerbic comment, see E Saulnier-Cassia, ‘Saisir 
ou ne pas saisir…telle est la question pour la Cour suprême britannique 
(2014) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 225. 
171 Joined Cases C-53/09 and C-55/09 HMRC v Loyalty Management UK Ltd 
and Baxi Group Ltd, above, n 151. 
172 Para 34. 
173 Statute, Article 20, fifth para. 
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reference,174 which meant that the CJEU was unable to consider the full range 
of factors that had been regarded as important in the national proceedings. He 
criticised the House of Lords for not making ‘sufficiently clear…what the 
central issues were’ and failing to direct the CJEU’s attention ‘to the 
facts…which bore most directly upon those issues.’175 He observed:176  
 
As a consequence of these aspects of the reference, a situation was 
created in which, instead of the dialogue between the Court of Justice 
and national courts which is the essence of the preliminary reference 
procedure, there was a danger that the ruling of the Court of Justice 
would fail to address the issues which lay at the heart of the appeal 
before the referring court. 
 
The Supreme Court was not therefore in a position to 
 
treat the ruling of the Court of Justice as dispositive of its decision, in 
so far as it was based upon an incomplete evaluation of the facts found 
by the [Value Added Tax and Duties] tribunal or addressed questions 
which failed fully to reflect [the arguments presented]. This court must 
174 Para 37. 
175 Para 30. 
176 Para 33.  
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nevertheless reach its decision in the light of such guidance as to the 
law as can be derived from the judgment of the Court of Justice.177 
 
This Lord Reed proceeded to do. 
These remarks, directly criticising the House of Lords for the way it had 
formulated the questions referred to the CJEU, must surely be 
unprecedented, yet more was to come. Lord Hope said candidly: ‘I think that it 
was a pity that a preliminary ruling was sought in this case.’178 The real issue 
was ‘how principles that are not themselves in doubt should be applied to 
particular facts…’ The absence of an Opinion meant that the CJEU’s 
‘judgment lacks the depth of reasoning which a judgment informed by an 
opinion would have provided.’179 The questions referred, he said, ‘tended to 
obscure what became the real issue when the case was argued in 
Luxembourg. For this reason the CJEU can hardly be blamed for not 
addressing that issue directly when it was conducting its analysis.’180 The 
situation had been further complicated by the simultaneous reference in 
another case. Lord Walker confessed: ‘I was one of the Law Lords who, five 
years ago, directed a reference to the Court of Justice, but with hindsight I 
177 Para 56. 
178 Para 87. 
179 Ibid. Saulnier-Cassia remarks on the inconsistency involved in lamenting 
the absence of an Advocate General’s Opinion in a case which it is said 
ought never to have been referred: above n 170, 226. 
180 Para 88. 
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recognise that it was unnecessary, and that it would have been better not to 
have made a reference.’181 
Only Lord Carnwath declined to take part in this collective assault on 
the House of Lords:182 
 
I do not see how we can, properly or responsibly, go behind either the 
decision of the House to make the reference, or the questions which 
were then approved with [the respondent’s] consent. Nor, still less (with 
respect to Lord Reed), do I believe that it is appropriate or fair for us 
now to decide that there were other relevant facts, necessary for the 
determination, but which, through oversight of ourselves and the 
parties, were not drawn to the attention of the court; and, further, that 
the true issues were not questions of law at all, so that we are free to 
redetermine them for ourselves as questions of fact, without regard to 
the CJEU’s conclusions on them. Those are to me entirely novel and 
controversial propositions… 
 
Lord Carnwath agreed with Lord Hope that the absence of an Advocate 
General’s Opinion was unfortunate, but did not ‘find any serious uncertainty 
about what the court has decided and why.’183 
181 Para 118. 
182 Para 123. 
183 Para 34. 
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The result was that Lord Reed, Lord Hope and Lord Walker were in 
favour of dismissing the appeal, while Lord Carnwath and Lord Wilson would 
have allowed it. It is evident that the issues raised were not acte clair and that 
they had not been fully éclairés by the reference to the CJEU. This meant that 
the Supreme Court should have made a further reference. The appellants 
asked the Supreme Court to do precisely that when the parties were invited to 
make written submissions as to the form of order to be issued. It declined to 
do so. Lord Reed, giving the judgment of the Court, pointed out that the 
majority had taken the view ‘that, with the benefit of hindsight, there had in 
reality been no need for a reference in the first place…’184 The CJEU ‘had itself 
considered that the case raised no new point of law.’185 The Court had applied 
the principles laid down in the case law of the CJEU to an account of the facts 
which was more comprehensive than that which had been supplied to the 
CJEU. There was therefore ‘no question of EU law which now requires to be 
elucidated, and therefore no need for a further reference.’186 Lord Reed added 
that it would be ‘unfortunate if the position were otherwise, bearing in mind 
that this litigation has already lasted since 2003.’187 
Whilst one can understand the frustration of the Supreme Court in this 
case, its refusal to make a further reference amounted to a deliberate 
disregard of the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 267. By 
184 [2013] UKSC 42, para 5. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Para 7. 
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the Court’s own admission, the CJEU treated the case as not raising any new 
point of law because the questions referred by the House of Lords and the 
account of the facts it had been given were defective. The period which had 
elapsed since the start of the litigation could have been shortened had a 
reference been made by a lower court and the reference eventually made by 
the House of Lords not been flawed. These circumstances are far removed 
from those identified in CILFIT as negating the obligation of supreme national 
courts to refer. It is hard to imagine that they would be included in any 
modified version of the CILFIT criteria that the CJEU might choose to 
elaborate. Since the appellant was an organ of the state, proceedings for 




In some cases where questions of EU law have been raised, the Supreme 
Court seems to have given very little consideration, if any, to the question 
whether a reference to the CJEU should be made. It is possible that the 
need for a reference may have been discussed with counsel, but when this 
occurs an outline of the discussion should be included in the judgment so 
that the Court’s reasoning is transparent. Where the Court has considered 
the possibility of a reference but decides not to make one, it has given a 
variety of reasons to explain its position. Some reasons, such as that the 
case is acte clair or éclairé or that it merely involves the application of the 
law to the facts and that this is a matter for the national court, are used 
regularly. Other reasons may be tailored to the circumstances of the 
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particular case. The fact that proceedings raising the same point may be 
pending in another forum is unlikely to dissuade the Court from making up 
its own mind. 
 
VI. The Quality of the Guidance Provided by the CJEU 
 
Where the Supreme Court decides not to make a reference, it is likely to be 
motivated not just by considerations specific to the case in hand, but also by 
a general view of the helpfulness of the procedure based on previous 
experience. The Supreme Court has been overtly critical of the approach of 
the CJEU on several occasions and it is to the nature of its criticisms that 
the discussion now turns. 
 
A. The Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
One source of dissatisfaction is the treatment by the CJEU of the Opinions 
of its Advocates General,188 to which the Supreme Court pays close 
attention in attempting to establish the requirements of EU law.189 This may 
188 For detailed and authoritative analysis of the role of the Advocate 
General, see L Clément-Wilz, La Fonction de l’Avocat Général près la Cour de 
justice (Brussles, Bruylant, 2011), especially chs 5 and 6. 
189 It also draws regularly on the views of academic writers: see eg Assange, 
(above n 46);  British American Tobacco Denmark v Kazemier Transport 
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be exemplified by Patmalniece.190 The applicant was born in Latvia. In 2005 
she claimed state pension credit but her claim was refused on the basis that 
she had no right to reside in the UK. Did that refusal constitute direct or 
indirect discrimination on the ground of nationality and, if the latter, could 
it be justified? Lord Hope (with whom Lady Hale and Lord Brown agreed) 
referred to the analysis of the CJEU’s case law on discrimination carried out 
by Advocate General Sharpston in her ‘powerful’191 Opinion in Bressol v 
Gouvernement de la Communauté Franҫaise.192 
The Bressol case raised the question whether legislation adopted by 
the French Community of Belgium on limiting access to certain higher 
education programmes contravened the EU prohibition against 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The legislation required students 
to show that their principal residence was in Belgium and that they satisfied 
one of a list of further conditions. The first was that the student had the 
right to remain permanently in Belgium. Advocate General Sharpston 
declared: 
 
I take there to be direct discrimination when the category of those 
receiving a certain advantage and the category of those suffering a 
[2015] UKSC 65; Cavendish Square Holding v Talal El Makdessi [2015] 
UKSC 67; Miller, above n 110. 
190 Above n 160. 
191 Para 32. 
192 Case C-73/08 [2010] ECR I-2735, EU:C:2010:181. 
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correlative disadvantage coincide exactly with the respective categories 
of persons distinguished only by applying a prohibited 
classification.193 
 
Discrimination was indirect where some other criterion was applied but it 
affected a substantially higher proportion of one group than another. On 
that basis, the Advocate General maintained that the condition relating to a 
student’s principal residence was indirectly discriminatory (and therefore 
capable of justification) because ‘Belgians and non-Belgians alike may 
establish their principal residence in Belgium.’ However, she thought the 
condition concerning the right to remain permanently in Belgium was 
directly discriminatory, because only Belgian nationals automatically had 
that right. The CJEU, however, dealt specifically only with the residence 
condition,194 which it agreed was indirectly discriminatory, before moving on 
to the question of justification.195 
Lord Hope concluded that the right to reside test at issue in 
Patmalniece had to be treated as indirectly discriminatory but objectively 
justified. Lord Walker (dissenting only on the issue of justification) was 
highly critical of the CJEU’s judgment:196 
 
193 Para 56 of her Opinion. 
194 Paras 45 and 46. 
195 Para 47. 
196 Para 63 
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the difference between the Advocate General’s opinion and the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment is profound. The opinion…sets out a lengthy, 
scholarly and closely-reasoned discussion of the difference between 
direct and indirect discrimination. The Grand Chamber made no 
reference to this discussion. It treated the case as one of indirect (and 
therefore potentially justifiable) discrimination without explaining 
why the Advocate General was wrong to treat the case as direct 
discrimination. 
 
He added: ‘I regret that the Grand Chamber did not explain why they 
disagreed with the Advocate General. She has…grappled with the real 
difficulties of this issue…’197 He declared: ‘I recognise that this Court must 
follow the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in Bressol, even if 
some of us do not fully understand its reasoning.’ 
The issue of how to distinguish direct from indirect discrimination 
also arose in Bull v Hall.198 One of the parties sought to rely on Maruko,199 
where the CJEU found that there had been direct discrimination. Lord 
Neuberger did not find that decision persuasive.200 His reasons included the 
facts that ‘the finding was an unreasoned assertion’ and ‘the Advocate 
General, in a fully reasoned analysis, had held that the discrimination was 
197 Para 64. Cf HS2, below n 224. 
198 [2013] UKSC 73. 
199 Case C-267/06 
200 Para 81. 
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indirect…’ He added that ‘the decision of the Grand Chamber on this point 
is very hard to reconcile with the well established CJEU and domestic 
jurisprudence…’201 
The Supreme Court has also on occasion drawn attention to the 
absence of an Advocate General’s Opinion in cases where this has been 
dispensed with under Article 20, fifth paragraph, of the Statute of the CJEU. 
In Aimia Coalition Loyalty,202 the judgment of Lord Carnwath contained a 
section headed ‘Absence of an Advocate-General’s Opinion’. He said it was 
‘unfortunate’203 that there was no Opinion. He pointed out204 that the case 
 
was a reference by the highest court in this country. It should have 
been clear from the judgments below, and the submissions, that it 
had raised serious differences as to the correct application of [the 
underlying] principles, including questions as to the authority of the 
leading House of Lords decision in the light of subsequent European 
authority. 
 
201 This did not involve any breach of EU law as the case concerned purely 
domestic legislation rather than legislation adopted to give effect to an EU 
obligation. 
202 [2013] UKSC 15. 
203 Para 128. 
204 Para 129. 
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He went on:205 
 
Experience shows that the Advocate-General’s Opinion can often 
provide a fuller discussion of the principles and their practical 
application, against which the sometimes sparse reasoning of the 
judgment can be easier to understand and apply. In this case, at least 
in retrospect, as the present controversy demonstrates, it was an 
unfortunate omission. 
 
There are two simple but important lessons here for the CJEU. The first is 
that Opinions by Advocates General are highly valued by the Supreme Court 
in helping it to resolve questions of EU law. There is at the very least a 
possibility that they are equally valued by courts in other Member States. 
The CJEU should therefore review the frequency with which it decides to 
dispense with an Opinion, for this sometimes leaves judgments built on 
sand which may be misapplied or even ignored by national courts. The 
second is that the CJEU’s practice of not engaging to any significant extent 
with the Opinions of its Advocates General can undermine the authority of 
its own judgments. Where the CJEU disagrees with an Advocate General, it 
should make this clear and set out its reasons. Otherwise its judgments risk 
looking like a series of unsubstantiated assertions. If the Opinion seems 
more persuasive to a national court, it may look for ways to avoid applying 
the judgment of the CJEU. 
205 Para 130. 
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 B. Reformulated Questions 
 
In R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State206 the applicants were seeking various 
declarations aimed at ensuring that the UK complied with the nitrogen 
dioxide limits laid down by EU law. The Supreme Court granted a 
declaration in relation to a breach of Article 13 of Directive 2008/50 on 
ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe,207 which Lord Carnwath 
(delivering the judgment of the Court) said had been ‘clearly established’.208 
However, he added,209 taking account of the CJEU’s guidelines on 
references,210 that the dispute raised additional ‘difficult issues of European 
law’211 requiring the guidance of the CJEU and on which the Supreme Court 
was obliged to make a reference.  
However, when the time came to consider the CJEU’s response,212 the 
Supreme Court found that the first two questions referred had been 
206 [2013] UKSC 25. 
207 OJ 2008 L 152/1. 
208 Para 37. 
209 Para 1 of the judgment.  
210 See now Recommendations to national courts and tribunals, in relation 
to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, OJ 2016 C 439/1. 
211 Para 38. 
212 Case C-404/13 ClientEarth v Secretary of State EU:C:2014:2382. 
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reformulated by the CJEU.213 This, according to Lord Carnwath (again 
delivering the judgment of the Court), had ‘introduced a degree of ambiguity 
which it had been hoped to avoid in the original formulation. This has had 
the unfortunate consequence of enabling each party to claim success on the 
issue.’214 Lord Carnwath also made the recurring complaint that there was 
no Advocate General’s Opinion ‘to provide background to the court’s 
characteristically sparse reasoning.’215 However, neither party wanted a new 
reference to be made, so he concluded that a mandatory order should be 
made requiring the Secretary of State to prepare new air quality plans in 
accordance with a fixed timetable. 
 
C. Lack of Jurisdiction 
 
Slightly different concerns were raised in USA v Nolan,216 which involved the 
closure by the appellant, the USA, of a watercraft repair centre it maintained 
in Hampshire, England. The respondent had been employed at the centre 
and its closure made her redundant. She complained that the appellant had 
failed to consult with staff representatives contrary to the Trade Union and 
213 For the CJEU’s practice of reformulating questions referred to it, see 
Broberg and Fenger, above n 1, 412-428; Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman, 
above n 1, 235-237. 
214 [2015] UKSC 28, para 6. 
215 Para 10. 
216 [2015] UKSC 63. 
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Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, as amended by regulations 
adopted in 1995 to give effect to a ruling against the UK in infringement 
proceedings brought by the Commission.217 The 1992 Act gave effect to 
Directive 77/187218 and its successor, Directive 98/59.219 The Employment 
Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal found in the respondent’s 
favour. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which referred to the 
CJEU a question concerning the point at which the obligation to consult 
about collective redundancies arose. 
Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 98/59 provided that it did not apply to 
workers employed by public administrative bodies or by establishments 
governed by public law. The CJEU therefore ruled that the civilian staff of a 
military base were not covered by the directive. This the CJEU said was 
consistent with the objective and general system of the directive, which was 
concerned with the functioning of the internal market, not the size and 
functioning of the armed forces. There was therefore no Union interest in 
217 Case C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2479, 
EU:C:1994:234 
218 On the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ 1977 L 61/26. 
219 On the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, OJ 1998 L 225/16. The appellant did not rely on 
state immunity, though it was accepted that it could have done so: see para 
3 of the judgment. 
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ensuring the uniform interpretation of the directive in the excluded area. 
Consequently the CJEU declined jurisdiction. This meant that the issues 
raised by the case would have to be resolved without the CJEU’s assistance. 
The Court of Appeal responded by dismissing the appeal. 
Doubts about the applicability of the directive in circumstances such 
as these had been raised by the Commission, but were not shared by 
Advocate General Mengozzi.220 He pointed out that Article 5 of the directive 
allowed Member States to introduce provisions that were more favourable to 
workers, a possibility of which the UK had taken advantage. He also noted 
that the CJEU had consistently held that, in order to ensure uniformity,  it 
had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on national provisions adopted 
voluntarily to mirror EU provisions.221 He therefore proposed that the CJEU 
should reply to the question referred and suggested how it should do so. 
The CJEU’s ruling could not therefore reasonably have been 
anticipated. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it encountered a 
metaphorical raised eyebrow from Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger, 
Lady Hale and Lord Reed agreed). The appellant argued that UK law should 
be read in the same sense as the directive, as interpreted by the CJEU. Lord 
Mance rejected that argument, noting that Directive 98/59 laid down only 
220 EU:C:2012:160. 
221 Para 24 of his Opinion. The leading case is Joined Cases C-297/88 and 
C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763. AG Mengozzi added that this approach 
had even been taken in a case concerning Directive 98/59: Case C-323/08 
Rodríguez Mayor and Others [2009] ECR I-11621. 
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minimum standards. It was also argued that the amendments made to the 
1992 Act by the 1995 regulations, on which the respondent was relying, 
were ultra vires, as they were based on section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 but went further than required by EU law. Lord 
Mance also rejected that argument. The 1992 Act 
 
in its unamended form represented a unified domestic regime. The 
Court of Justice in 1994 identified a flaw in the protection 
provided…It is entirely unsurprising that the 1995 Regulations did not 
distinguish between parts of [the 1992 Act] which were and were not 
within the internal market competence or within article 1(2)(b) of the 
Directive. 
 
Parliament having created that link, ‘the executive was entitled to take it 
into account and to continue it by and in the 1995 Regulations.’222 The 
appeal was therefore dismissed.223 
The line taken by the CJEU here was curious. The reference had been 
made by the UK’s second highest court, with the possibility of a subsequent 
appeal to the Supreme Court. The judgment of the CJEU involved a 
departure from established case law and ignoring the advice of its Advocate 
General. It failed to offer the referring court any useful guidance. The case 
222 Para 72. 
223 Lord Carnwath (dissenting) would have allowed the appeal on the basis 
that the 1995 regulations fell outside the power conferred by the 1972 Act. 
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will have done little to enhance the reputation of the CJEU among British 
judges as a reliable partner. 
  
D. Constitutional Identity and Approach to Interpretation 
 
By far the most thunderous shot across the bows of the CJEU to date was 
unleashed in HS2224 by Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance in a joint judgment 
with which all the other Justices agreed. The first issue addressed by Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Mance was the CJEU’s approach to interpretation. 
Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/42 concerning the protection of the 
environment referred to plans and programmes ‘which are required by 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions…’ The CJEU had held 
that ‘required’ meant ‘regulated’.225 Article 1(5) of Directive 85/337 (as 
amended), which also concerned environmental protection, provided that 
this directive did not apply to ‘projects the details of which are adopted by a 
specific act of national legislation, since the objectives of this Directive, 
including that of supplying information, are achieved through the legislative 
process.’ The CJEU had held that ‘since’ in effect meant ‘provided that’. The 
result was that the directive might after all apply to projects adopted by a 
224 [2014] UKSC 3. 
225 Case C-567/10 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles ASBL and others v Région 
de Bruxelles-Capitale EU:C:2011:755. 
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specific act of national legislation if it were found that the objectives of the 
directive had not been achieved through the legislative process.226 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance made a number of comments. In a 
legislative process, compromises or concessions had to be made and 
objectives were not always achieved. When reading or interpreting 
legislation, it should not be assumed that objectives have been fully 
achieved. Qualifications might have been necessary to reach agreement. 
‘Where the legislature has agreed a clearly expressed measure, reflecting the 
legislators’ choices and compromises in order to achieve agreement, it is not 
for courts to rewrite the legislation, to extend or “improve” it in respects 
which the legislator clearly did not intend.’227 If people could not be certain 
that EU legislation meant what it said, they might lose confidence in EU law 
and the relationship between national courts and the CJEU might be 
undermined. It would be more difficult to decide whether a point of EU law 
was acte clair and to reach agreement on new legislation. 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance then turned to the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott in Inter-Environnement Bruxelles, where she said 
that ‘required’ meant based on a legal obligation. Had the question come 
before the Supreme Court, they would ‘unhesitatingly have reached the 
same conclusion…’228 They continued:229 
226 See the cases cited in para 162 of the judgment of the Supreme Court. 
227 Para 171. 
228 Para 187. 
229 Para 188. 
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 We would also have regarded this as clear to the point where no 
reference under the CILFIT principles was required. The reasons given 
by the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice would not have 
persuaded us to the contrary. While they allude, in the briefest of 
terms, to the fact that the Governments made submissions based on 
the clear language of article 2(a) and on the legislative history, they do 
not actually address or answer them or any other aspect of Advocate 
General Kokott’s reasoning. 
 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance conducted a similar analysis of the CJEU’s 
finding that the word ‘since’ in Article 1(5) of Directive 85/337 meant 
‘provided that’, observing: ‘it is difficult to see why it should be supposed 
that the Council of Ministers as the European legislator intended a 
condition, or intended the word “since” to have anything other than its 
ordinary meaning.’230 Moreover, this particular issue gave rise to a deeper 
concern about ‘the fundamental institutions of national democracy in 
Europe.’231 Echoing Lord Reed, they pointed out that ‘Article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights, one of the pillars of [the] constitutional settlement which established 
the rule of law in England in the 17th century, precludes the impeaching or 
questioning in any court of debates or proceedings in Parliament.’232 
230 Para 196. 
231 Para 202. 
232 Para 203. 
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Examination of the workings of Parliament and enquiring whether they met 
requirements imposed from the outside would clearly involve ‘questioning 
and potentially impeaching (i.e. condemning) Parliament’s internal 
proceedings, and would go a considerable step further than any United 
Kingdom court has ever gone.’233 It was, 
 
putting the point at its lowest, certainly arguable (and it is for United 
Kingdom law and courts to determine) that there may be fundamental 
principles, whether contained in other constitutional instruments or 
recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the 
European Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or 
authorise the abrogation.234 
 
Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lord Wilson agreed) 
returned to some of these issues in Pham v Secretary of State,235 which 
concerned the question whether under the British Nationality Act 1981 the 
Secretary of State could deprive the appellant, who was suspected of 
involvement in terrorism, of British citizenship if doing do would render him 
stateless.236 Because depriving the appellant of British citizenship would 
233 Para 206. 
234 Para 207. 
235 [2015] UKSC 19. 
236 Cf Case C-135/08 Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449, 
EU:C:2010:104. 
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mean that he lost EU citizenship too, the Supreme Court considered the 
position in EU law. The case was ultimately remitted to the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) for further consideration. No 
reference was made, although the possibility of a reference at a later stage 
was not ruled out. 
Laws LJ had observed in R (G1) v Secretary of State:237 ‘The conditions 
on which national citizenship is conferred, withheld or revoked are integral 
to the identity of the nation State. They touch the constitution; for they 
identify the constitution’s participants.’ If the CJEU sought to interfere in 
such matters, UK courts might have to consider whether the European 
Communities Act had conferred on it authority to do so. Lord Mance 
agreed:238 
 
European law is certainly special and represents a remarkable 
development in the world’s legal history. But, unless and until the rule 
of recognition by which we shape our decisions is altered, we must 
view the United Kingdom as independent, Parliament as sovereign and 
European law as part of domestic law because Parliament has so 
willed. The question how far Parliament has so willed is thus 
determined by construing the 1972 Act. 
 
237 [2013] QB 1008, para 43. See also Thoburn and Others v Sunderland City 
Council and Others (‘Metric Martyrs’) [2003] QB 151. 
238 Para 80. 
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Having referred in paragraphs 86-89 of his judgment to Declaration No 2 
annexed to the Maastricht Final Act, the Council Decision of 1992 
concerning Denmark239 and Declaration No 3 annexed to the Lisbon Final 
Act, he went on: 
 
A domestic court faces a particular dilemma if, in the face of the clear 
language of a Treaty and of associated declarations and decisions, 
such as those mentioned in paras 86-89, the Court of Justice reaches 
a decision which oversteps jurisdictional limits which Member States 
have clearly set at the European Treaty level and which are reflected 
domestically in their constitutional arrangements. But, unless the 
Court of Justice has had conferred upon it under domestic law 
unlimited as well as unappealable power to determine and expand the 
scope of European law, irrespective of what the Member States clearly 
agreed, a domestic court must ultimately decide for itself what is 
consistent with its own domestic constitutional arrangements, 
including in the case of the 1972 Act what jurisdictional limits exist 
under the European Treaties and upon the competence conferred on 
European institutions including the Court of Justice. 
 
To avoid problems, it was necessary ‘that all concerned should act with 
mutual respect and with caution in areas where Member States’ 
constitutional identity is or may be engaged…’ That reflected ‘the spirit of 
239 OJ 1992 C 348/1. 
Page 82 of 90 
 
                                                          
co-operation of which both the Bundesverfassungsgericht and this court 




There have been several instances of overt criticism of the CJEU by the 
Supreme Court. Particular topics of dissatisfaction have been the lack of 
engagement by the CJEU with the Opinions of its Advocates General and the 
reformulation by the CJEU of the questions referred in ways which were not 
considered helpful to the resolution of the dispute. In one case, the CJEU 
declined jurisdiction, leaving the case to be resolved ultimately by the 
Supreme Court. 
More importantly, in HS2 the Supreme Court embraced the idea that 
the primacy accorded to EU law by the European Communities Act 1972 
might not be absolute. It thereby aligned itself, 50 years after Costa v ENEL, 
with some of the highest courts in Europe, most notably the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, in rejecting the notion that EU law enjoys 
unqualified primacy over national law. The Court was driven to articulate 
this stance by the approach of the CJEU, particularly its all too frequent 
inability to give persuasive reasons for the conclusions it reaches and its 
tendency to meddle with what it sees as the failings of the legislature or the 
Member States. It is an indictment of the CJEU that the Supreme Court 
240 Para 91. 
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should have considered it necessary to spell out so bluntly basic principles 
about the role of courts. 
The timing of the judgment in HS2 was interesting. It was delivered on 
22 January 2014, almost exactly 12 months after the Bloomberg speech of 
the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, in which he announced his 
intention if re-elected to hold a referendum on the UK’s continued 
membership of the EU. When the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified, Cameron 
had also promised to enact a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make clear 
that ultimate authority rested with the UK Parliament. Although that 
promise was kept with the enactment of section 18 of the European Union 
Act 2011,241 the idea resurfaced during the campaign preceding the June 
2016 referendum. Is it possible that the Supreme Court thought that the 
moment might be a propitious one for a reassertion of the sovereignty of 
Parliament and its own prerogatives in the face of the competing claims of 
the CJEU? Perhaps not. The media and many politicians seemed unaware of 
the Court’s bold pronouncements in HS2, even though they undermined any 
case for a more expansive Sovereignty Bill and were less likely than an Act of 
Parliament to attract infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. 
Ironically, in an article published in the Daily Mail on 3 December 2016 
shortly before the hearing in Miller,242 Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance were 
both given the maximum ‘five-star’ rating for Europhilia. 
241 See G Gee and A Young, ‘Regaining Sovereignty? Brexit, the UK 
Parliament and the Common Law’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 131. 
242 Above n 110. 
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 VII. Conclusion 
 
There has been a subtle yet marked change since 2009 in the approach of 
the UK’s apex court to the preliminary rulings procedure. It is possible that 
the change would have occurred even if the Supreme Court had not been 
created, for some of the contributory factors would surely have affected the 
House of Lords in a similar way: the expanding scope and complexity of EU 
law, causing an increase in the number of cases turning on difficult 
questions of the effect of the Treaties and the legislation adopted 
thereunder; the arrival in the upper echelons of the legal profession of 
practitioners with experience and expert knowledge of EU law. But it is also 
possible that the departure from the second chamber of Parliament and 
move to premises of their own encouraged the Justices to compare 
themselves more directly with the apex courts of other Member States.243 
The CJEU has not succeeded in persuading all such courts that the EU is 
an autonomous legal order that takes effect in the Member States on its own 
terms. Many of them adhere to the competing view, now seemingly more in 
keeping with the times, that EU law is applicable within their jurisdiction by 
virtue of national law, of which they are ultimately the guardians. The CJEU 
may have been heartened when the Bundesverfassungsgericht made its first 
243 See P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 6th ed, 2015) 278-
309; A-M Slaughter, A Sone Sweet and J Weiler (eds), The European Courts 
and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford, Hart, 1997). 
Page 85 of 90 
 
                                                          
ever reference in the Gauweiler case244 and then complied with the guidance 
it was given.245 However, in December 2016 it was dealt a further blow by 
another old adversary, the Supreme Court of Denmark,246 which refused to 
comply with a sternly worded judgment247 requiring it to apply the general 
principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age in accordance with 
the poorly reasoned Mangold decision.248 If apex courts of other Member 
244 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag 
EU:C:2015:400. The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional and the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel are among other apex courts which waited some 
time before making their first references. See respectively Case C-399/11 
Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal EU:C:2013:107;  Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v 
Premier Ministre EU:C:2013:358. 
245 Judgment of 21 June 2016. 
246 Decision of the Supreme Court of Denmark, Case no. 15/2014, 6 
December 2016.  
247 Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of 
Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, judgment of 19 April 2016, EU:C:2016:278. 
248 Case C-144/04 [2005] ECR I-9981, EU:C:2005:709. See further A 
Dashwood, “From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect 
to Absurdity?” (2006-07) 9 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
81; M Dougan, “In Defence of Mangold?” in A Arnull, C Barnard, M Dougan 
and E Spaventa, A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 219. 
Page 86 of 90 
 
                                                          
States behave in this way, the Supreme Court may have thought, should it 
not follow suit so that the UK is not placed at a disadvantage? 
The Supreme Court has largely insulated itself from the inter-court 
competition fostered by the preliminary rulings procedure, which can loosen 
the control apex national courts are able to exert over lower courts.249 In 
building this position it has been assisted by the expertise of its members, 
for whom EU law is now part of their stock in trade. Collectively they have 
shown considerable facility with languages other than English, which 
enables them to compare different language versions of provisions under 
scrutiny and to engage with the case law of other European apex courts. The 
common law style in which their judgments are written enables them to 
analyse thoroughly the issues at stake. In Luxembourg, only the Advocates 
General can compete with this level of rigour. As Burrows and Greaves point 
out: ‘The key point about the [Advocate General’s] Opinion is that it is 
249 See J Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge, CUP, 1999) 197; K 
Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in A-M 
Slaughter, A Stone Sweet and J Weiler, (eds), The European Courts and 
National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford, Hart, 1997) 227; K 
Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 47–
52. A leading example is Case C-416/10 Jozef Križan and Others v Slovenská 
inšpekcia životného prostredia EU:C:2013:8. Heyvaert, Thornton and Drabble 
argue that there is little evidence of such competition in environmental law 
cases (above n 98, 432). 
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written to convince the audience, the Court.’250 It is not therefore surprising 
that Opinions are consulted frequently by the Supreme Court. By 
comparison, the meagre reasoning often given by the CJEU can appear 
unconvincing, especially where it does not follow the Advocate General or 
decides to dispense with an Opinion. 
The approach of the Supreme Court to matters of EU law is far from 
unblemished. Abbey National and Aimia Coalition Loyalty are major blots on 
its copybook. The Justices do not apply a consistent method in analysing 
whether a reference should be made.251 When they decide not to refer, their 
reasoning does not always seem adequate to satisfy the requirements of Article 
6(1) ECHR. Sometimes there are too many individual judgments. Sometimes 
they are too long. But a concerted effort seems to have been made to bear 
down on some of these failings. In the complex Franked Investment Income 
case, Lord Hope gave a short introductory judgment ‘to assist the reader in 
understanding at the outset what the issues are…’252 In HS2, Lord Carnwath 
250 N Burrows and R Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law (Oxford, 
OUP, 2007) 30. 
251 Heyvaert, Thornton and Drabble observe that the domestic judiciary 
generally ‘are at risk of adopting an ad hoc and unpredictable approach to 
references, thereby creating legal uncertainty’ (above n 98, 433). 
252 Para 1. It might be helpful if longer judgments followed the example of 
the CJEU and incorporated tables of contents to assist the reader to 
navigate them. 
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and Lord Reed shared some of the judicial heavy lifting. In many cases, a 
judgment by one Justice is endorsed by all the other members of the panel. 
 The UK notified the European Council of its intention to leave the EU on 
29 March 2017. In principle, the EU Treaties will therefore cease to apply to 
the UK at midnight on 29 March 2019 pursuant to Article 50(3) TEU unless 
that deadline is extended. It is likely (though not certain) that, ahead of the 
point of departure, an agreement will have been negotiated between the EU27 
and the UK ‘setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of 
the framework for its future relationship with the Union.’253 It is possible that 
the withdrawal agreement will provide for transitional arrangements before the 
UK becomes a third state and negotiations begin on its future relations with 
the remaining Member States. 
The British Prime Minister, Theresa May, has repeatedly emphasised 
her wish, as part of the process of withdrawal, to extract the UK from the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU.254 However, the guidelines adopted by the European 
Council on 29 April 2017 under Article 50(2) TEU and the negotiating 
253 Article 50(2) TEU. It is theoretically conceivable that the withdrawal 
agreement could enter into force before 29 March 2019, but this seems 
highly unlikely. 
254 See eg her speeches to the Conservative Party Conference on 2 October 
2016 and at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017 setting out the UK’s 
negotiating objectives for exiting the EU. See also HM Government, The 
United Kingdom’s Exit From and New Partnership With the European Union 
(Cm 9417) 13. 
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directives published by the Council 22 May 2017255 indicate that the EU27 
see a continuing role for the CJEU in respect of the UK. This could encompass 
proceedings pending before the CJEU on the withdrawal date, including 
preliminary references and ongoing infringement proceedings, as well as 
judicial proceedings concerning the UK brought after the withdrawal date in 
respect of facts which occurred before that date. It could also embrace 
disputes relating to the enforcement of the withdrawal agreement. 
If these proposals made their way into that agreement, the CJEU would 
remain a significant influence on the UK legal system beyond the withdrawal 
date. At the same time, it would continue to be subject to the scrutiny of the 
UK Supreme Court. That court has exposed with sometimes brutal clarity the 
need for the CJEU to make greater use of its Advocates General; to improve 
the quality of its reasoning; and above all to respect the limits of the judicial 
role in a modern democratic polity. 
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